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Pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, the President has the
power to make treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds
of the Senate, and these treaties uncontroversially become binding
on the United States as a matter of international law. The status
of such treaties within the U.S. legal system is less clear. The Su-
premacy Clause states that, along with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, treaties made by the United States are part of the
"supreme Law of the Land." At least since the Supreme Court's 1829
decision in Foster v Neilson, however, it has been understood that
treaty provisions are directly enforceable in U.S. courts only if they
are "self-executing."' The legitimacy and implications of this self-
execution requirement have generated substantial controversy and
confusion among both courts and commentators.
Much of the debate over self-execution has been fought out, at
least in part, on originalist territory, with competing claims about
what the constitutional Founders would have understood. Whatever
one may think of the virtues of originalist methodology in general,
it has not been successful in moving the self-execution debate for-
ward. Among other things, both treaty practice and the nation's
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position in the world have changed so dramatically since the Found-
ing that is difficult for originalism to compel contemporary con-
clusions. It is noteworthy, for example, that most scholarship on
self-execution hardly mentions the phenomenon of congressional-
executive agreements (which are ratified by the President with the
approval of a majority of both houses of Congress rather than two-
thirds of the Senate), even though they constitute the vast majority
of international agreements concluded by the United States since
the 1930s.2 Similarly, the development in the modern era of leg-
islative-style multilateral treaties, many of which overlap substan-
tially with domestic legislation, poses issues not contemplated by
the Founders.3
The Supreme Court's decision last Term in Medellin v Texas con-
tains the most extensive discussion of treaty self-execution in the
Court's history.4 In that case, the Court held that a treaty obligation
of the United States to comply with a decision of the International
Court of Justice (the international adjudicatory arm of the United
Nations that sits in The Hague) was not self-executing and thus
could not be applied by U.S. courts to override an otherwise valid
state rule of criminal procedure. The Court also held that the Pres-
ident lacked the unilateral authority to compel state courts to com-
ply with the International Court's decision. The decision is both
controversial and subject to differing interpretations and thus, if
anything, is likely to intensify the debate.
My goal in this article is to clear up some conceptual confusion
relating to the self-execution doctrine and, in the process, better
explain the contemporary practice of the courts and political
branches relating to treaty enforcement. To that end, I will make
three claims about treaty self-execution. First, the Supremacy
Clause does not by itself tell us the extent to which treaties should
be judicially enforceable. Second, the relevant intent in discerning
self-execution is the intent of the U.S. treaty-makers (that is, the
President and Senate), not the collective intent of the various parties
to the treaty. Third, even if treaties and statutes have an equivalent
status in the U.S. legal system in the abstract, there are important
2 See Oona Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Law-
making in the United States, 117 Yale L J 1236 (2008).
' See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich L Rev 390,
396-97 (1998).
4 See 128 S Ct 1346 (2008).
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structural and functional differences between them that are relevant
to judicial enforceability.
As will be shown, these three claims are interconnected. The
central theme connecting them is that treaties have a dual nature,
in that they operate both within the domain of international politics
as well as within the domain of law. In addition to having a certain
status within international law, and potentially also within domestic
law, every treaty is a contract that implicates the U.S. relationship
with one or more other nations, and such a relationship inherently
includes political as well as legal elements, such as considerations
of reciprocity, reputation, and national interest. This duality of trea-
ties is in turn relevant, as I will explain, to their domestic judicial
enforceability.5 The three claims set forth in this article are also
complementary, in that each of them is best understood along with
the other two, and together they present a relatively coherent ex-
planation for the judicial precedent in the area, including (despite
its ambiguities) the Medellin decision, as well as the practices of the
political branches.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the academic debates over
treaty self-execution, some of the uncertainties surrounding the
issue, and what is at stake. Part II defends and explains the impli-
cations of my first claim: that the Supremacy Clause does not by
itself tell us the extent to which treaties should be judicially en-
forceable. Part III defends the second claim: that the relevant intent
concerning self-execution is that of the U.S. treaty-makers. Part IV
defends the third claim: that, even if statutes and treaties have equiv-
alent legal status in the abstract, they are different in important
ways that relate to judicial enforceability. Finally, Part V explains
how Medellin, despite its ambiguities, is generally consistent with
these three claims.
In staking out these claims, I will refer extensively to the work
of Professor Carlos Vdzquez, who has been the most prolific and
sophisticated theorist about treaty self-execution and who recently
'There is a long-standing theoretical debate about how to conceive of the relationship
between international law and domestic law, a debate that is sometimes framed as one
between "monism" and "dualism." The term "dualism" in that debate refers to the view
"that international and domestic law are distinct, each nation determines for itself when
and to what extent international law is incorporated into its legal system, and the status
of international law in the domestic system is determined by domestic law." Curtis A.
Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 Stan L Rev
529, 530 (1999). My use of the term "duality" in this article is not intended to engage
with that debate.
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published an important article on the topic in the Harvard Law
Review. Although my article will focus primarily on points of dis-
agreement between us, I should emphasize at the outset that there
are many points relating to treaty self-execution on which we agree,
and I have benefited greatly from his work on the subject.
I. THE SELF-EXECUTION DEBATE
As Professor Vfizquez has usefully explained, there are a
number of possible reasons why a U.S. court might decline to en-
force a treaty that has gone through the Article II process.6 A treaty
may call for a governmental action, such as the appropriation of
money or the creation of criminal liability, that is thought to lie
exclusively within the powers of the full Congress. Some treaty
cases, like some constitutional and statutory cases, may be nonjus-
ticiable-for example, because of standing requirements or the po-
litical question doctrine. Or the case may depend upon the rec-
ognition of a private right of action, and the court may conclude
that the treaty does not itself confer such a right of action. Finally,
a court may conclude that a treaty was not intended to be judicially
enforceable unless and until implemented by a political branch,
usually Congress. The Foster decision relied on this last proposition,
and Professor Vlizquez refers to this doctrine as "Foster-type non-
self-execution."7 It is this type of non-self-execution that is the focus
of this article.
Critics of Foster-type non-self-execution contend that it is at odds
with, or at least in tension with, the Supremacy Clause, which states
that "all" treaties made by the United States shall be the supreme
law of the land. Foster-type non-self-execution, the argument goes,
means that only some treaties are given effect as supreme law of the
land.8 In part because they view Foster-type non-self-execution as
difficult to reconcile with the Supremacy Clause, critics contend
that there should at least be a strong presumption in favor of treaty
6 See Carlos Manuel Vfizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am J Intl
L 695 (1995).
' See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv L Rev 599, 602 (2008).
'See Vizquez, 89 Am J Intl L at 706 (cited in note 6); Vzquez, 122 Harv L Rev at
610 (cited in note 7); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am J Intl L 760, 760
(1988); see also Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 199 (2d
ed 1996) ("[Chief Justice] Marshall [in Foster] . . . felt obligated to read an exception into
the Supremacy Clause.").
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self-execution. Professor Vfizquez has argued, for example, that "the
concept of a non-self-executing treaty is in tension with the Su-
premacy Clause's designation of treaties as 'law'," and that, as a
result, "our Constitution should be read to establish a presumption
that treaties are self-executing."9
The most prominent counterpoint to this view has come from
Professor John Yoo. In a lengthy article published in the Columbia
Law Review, Yoo argued that the original understanding of the con-
stitutional Founders was that treaties would not operate as domestic
law when they (as is often the case today) addressed matters falling
within the scope of Congress's legislative authority.1" In a subse-
quent article, Yoo argued that requiring legislative implementation
for many treaties is also supported by constitutional text and struc-
ture." As an alternative to his constitutional claim, Yoo contended
that there should at least be a presumption against treaty self-ex-
ecution, such that the treaty-makers would be required to issue a
"clear statement" if they wanted a treaty to be self-executing. 2
At least before Medellin, it was unclear to what extent the case
law supported one view or the other, although it seems fair to say
that it did not implement what Professor Yoo claimed was the orig-
inal understanding (as he essentially conceded). Courts have often
enforced treaties directly without consideration of whether the trea-
ties addressed matters falling within Congress's legislative author-
ity.13 In particular, as noted in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, "[p]rovisions in treaties of friendship, commerce,
and navigation, or other agreements conferring rights on foreign
nationals, especially in matters ordinarily governed by State law,
have been given effect without any implementing legislation, their
'Carlos Manuel V'izquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 Colum L Rev 2154, 2157, 2173 (1999).
'0 See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 Colum L Rev 1955 (1999).
11 See John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking. A Textual and Structural Defense of
Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum L Rev 2218 (1999).
"2 Id at 2255. For critical responses to Yoo's articles, see Martin S. Flaherty, History
Right? Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the
Land," 99 Colum L Rev 2095 (1999), and Vkzquez, 99 Colum L Rev 2154 (cited in note
9).
9" See, for example, Kolovrat v Oregon, 366 US 187 (1961) (applying treaty with Serbia
to allow Yugoslavian nationals to inherit personal property from Oregon decedent); Asak-
ura v City of Seattle, 265 US 332 (1924) (applying treaty with Japan to preempt Seattle
ordinance that disallowed noncitizens from being licensed as pawnbrokers); Ware v Hylton,
3 US 199 (1796) (applying treaty with Great Britain to preempt Virginia statute that
restricted ability of British creditors to recover on pre-Revolutionary War debts).
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self-executing character assumed without discussion."14 On the
other hand, lower courts in recent years have often been reluctant
to allow private judicial enforcement of treaties, especially multi-
lateral treaties, so much so that it is arguable that the modern case
law suggests a presumption against self-execution. 5
Modern lower court decisions have also highlighted a number of
uncertainties surrounding the self-execution doctrine. One uncer-
tainty concerns the relevant intent that courts should look to in
discerning self-execution. If self-execution is like the substantive
terms in the treaty, then, as with a domestic contract, a court should
attempt to discern the collective intent of the parties. 6 Some courts
have in fact suggested that approach, albeit without much analysis. 7
The Restatement, by contrast, takes the position that the relevant
intent is that of the U.S. treaty-makers-that is, the Senate and
President' 5-and courts have in fact given particular weight to evi-
dence of U.S. intent.19
Another, somewhat related uncertainty concerns the materials
that courts should look at in discerning the relevant intent. The
Court in Foster emphasized the treaty text, but it is not clear when
treaty text will be deemed to suggest self-execution or non-self-
execution. There have also been questions about the extent to which
it is proper for courts to take account of nontextual materials, such
as drafting or ratification history. In the 1970s and 1980s, some
lower courts developed multifactored tests for self-execution. These
factors included the following considerations:
"4 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 111, re-
porters' note 5 (1987).
"s See, for example, United States v Emuegbunam, 268 F3d 377, 389 (6th Cir 2001) ("As
a general rule, however, international treaties do not create rights that are privately en-
forceable in the federal courts."); United States v Li, 206 F3d 56, 60 (1st Cir 2000) (en
banc) ("[T]reaties do not generally create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal
courts."); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v United States, 967 F2d 965, 968 (5th Cir 1992) ("In-
ternational treaties are not presumed to create rights that are privately enforceable.").
6 See, for example, Air France v Saks, 470 US 392, 399 (1985) (noting that, when
interpreting the meaning of a treaty, U.S. courts attempt "to give the specific words of
the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties");
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v United States District Court, 482 US 522, 533
(1987) ("In interpreting an international treaty, we are mindful that it is 'in the nature of
a contract between nations,' to which 'general rules of construction apply."').
, See cases cited in note 66.
, See text accompanying note 68.
,9 See David H. Moore, An Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 Geo Wash L
Rev 1, 12-14 (2006); Vizquez, 89 Am J Intl L at 705 n 47 (cited in note 6).
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(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2)
the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of
the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and
feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the im-
plications of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the
capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.2"
Some courts also have suggested that deference should be given to
the views of the Executive Branch, at the time of the litigation, with
respect to whether a treaty is self-executing.2
Courts have also had to address the effect of "non-self-execution
declarations" attached by the Senate to its advice and consent to
some treaties. Since early in U.S. history, the Senate has had a
practice of qualifying its consent to certain treaties through the
adoption of reservations and other limitations.22 Starting in the
1970s, with the support of the Executive Branch, the Senate began
considering the adoption of "non-self-execution declarations" in
connection with its consent to the ratification of human rights trea-
ties, and it began adopting these declarations in the early 1990s.
These declarations have been voted on by the Senate as part of its
resolution of advice and consent to the treaties, and have been
typically included in the U.S. instrument of ratification that is com-
municated to the other treaty parties. Before Medellin, the Senate
had utilized these formal non-self-execution declarations in con-
nection with a few treaties outside the human rights area as well,
but such declarations were uncommon. For most treaties, the Senate
and Executive Branch either did not express a view about self-
execution, or they expressed a view in less formal ratification ma-
terials, such as the President's letter of transmittal to the Senate or
the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
As Professor Jack Goldsmith and I have explained, the U.S.
treaty-makers have articulated a number of reasons for using the
formal non-self-execution declarations in the human rights area:
First, they believe that, taking into account the substantive res-
ervations and interpretive conditions, U.S. domestic laws and
20 Frolova v Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F2d 370, 373 (7th Cir 1985); see also,
for example, United States v Postal, 589 F2d 862, 877 (5th Cir 1979).
21 See, for example, More v Intelcom Support Services, Inc., 960 F2d 466, 472 (5th Cir
1992).
22 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U Pa L Rev 399, 400-402 (2000).
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remedies are sufficient to meet U.S. obligations under human
rights treaties. There is thus no additional need, in their view,
for domestic implementation. Second, there is concern that the
treaty terms, although similar in substance to U.S. law, are not
identical in wording and thus might have a destabilizing effect
on domestic rights protections if considered self-executing.
Third, there is disagreement about which treaty terms, if any,
would be self-executing. The declaration is intended to provide
certainty about this issue in advance of litigation. Finally, the
treatymakers believe that if there is to be a change in the scope
of domestic rights protections, it should be done by legislation
with the participation of the House of Representatives.23
Although courts consistently have treated these declarations as dis-
positive of the issue of self-execution,24 some commentators have
questioned their validity, arguing, among other things, that they
are at odds with the Supremacy Clause."
An important recent addition to the literature on self-execution
came from Professor Tim Wu.26 Professor Wu analyzed the patterns
of judicial enforcement of treaties throughout U.S. history and
found that courts had consistently enforced treaties in cases in-
volving state breaches of treaty obligations, but that, as a result of
institutional deference, they often had not enforced treaties when
they perceived that doing so would conflict with the wishes of Con-
gress or, at least in some instances, the Executive Branch. Professor
Wu further concluded that, as his institutional deference explana-
tion would predict, the role for direct judicial enforcement of trea-
ties has been eroded by the twentieth-century rise of congressional-
executive agreements, since, he argued, these agreements shift
implementation authority from the courts to Congress.
Not surprisingly, the Court's decision in Medellin is spurring a
23 Id at 419-20.
14 See, for example, Renkel v United States, 456 F3d 640, 644 (6th Cir 2006) (collecting
cases); Auguste v Ridge, 395 F3d 123, 141 n 17 (3d Cir 2005) (same).
25 See, for example, Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 Geo Wash J Intl L &
Econ 49, 64 (1997); John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DePaul L Rev 1287, 1302-04 (1993); David Sloss, Non-Self-
Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 UC Davis L Rev 1, 46-55 (2002);
cf. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution at 202 (cited in note 8) (arguing
that the practice of non-self-execution declarations "is 'anti-Constitutional' in spirit and
highly problematic as a matter of law").
6 See Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 Va L Rev 571 (2007).
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new round of debate over treaty self-execution.27 In a recent article
in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Vizquez further develops
arguments from his past writings on the subject.28 He contends that,
as a result of the Supremacy Clause, there should be a "requirement
of equivalent treatment"-that is, that "treaties are presumptively
enforceable in court in the same circumstances as constitutional and
statutory provisions of like content."29 In addition, while he accepts
that Foster-type non-self-execution can be an exception to this re-
quirement, he contends that there should be a presumption in favor
of self-execution "that can be overcome only through a clear state-
ment that the obligations in a particular treaty are subject to leg-
islative implementation. 30
The Senate has also adjusted its practices after Medellin, and its
adjustments are raising new questions. The Senate is expressing its
views about self-execution more frequently than in the past, and it
is more consistently doing so in its formal resolution of advice and
consent rather than in less formal ratification materials.31 At the
same time, the Senate has not been recommending that these formal
declarations be included with the U.S. instrument of ratification
that is communicated to the other treaty parties.32 Finally, the Senate
has for the first time been attaching self-execution as well as non-
self-execution declarations to its advice and consent to some trea-
ties,33 and there is some question about whether those new decla-
27 For an online debate that occurred shortly after the decision, see Federalist Society
Online Debate, Medellin v. Texas, Part I: Self-Execution (March 28, 2008) (featuring Ted
Cruz, David Sloss, Nick Rosenkranz, and Edwin Williamson), at http://www.fed-soc.org/
debates/dbtid. 17/default.asp.
21 See Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev 599 (cited in note 7).
:9 Id at 602.
30 Id.
"' See, for example, Exec Rep 110-12, 110th Cong, 2d Sess, Extradition Treaties with the
European Union at 9 (Sept 11, 2008) ("Such a statement, while generally included in the doc-
uments associated with treaties submitted to the Senate by the executive branch and in committee
reports, has not generally been included in Resolutions of advice and consent."), at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgidbname = 11 0cong reports&docid = f:er012
. 10.pdf.
32 See, for example, Exec Rept 110-19, 110th Cong, 2d Sess, International Convention
on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships at 9-10 (Sept 11, 2008) (indicating
that a declaration of non-self-execution, unlike a different declaration included in the resolution
of advice and consent, would not be included in the instrument of ratification), at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 110_congreports&docid = f:er0 19
.pdf.
31 See 154 Cong Rec S9328-S9332 (Sept 23, 2008) (senatorial advice and consent for
various mutual legal assistance, extradition, and tax treaties, containing a declaration for
each one stating that, "This Treaty is self-executing.").
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rations are constitutionally valid.34
There are a number of issues at stake in the self-execution debate.
As suggested above, one issue concerns the validity of non-self-
execution and self-execution declarations attached by the Senate to
its advice and consent to some treaties. To the extent that these
declarations are valid and binding, their increased use will simplify
the self-execution question going forward. The United States is
already a party to thousands of treaties, however, that lack such
Senate declarations. It seems likely after Medellin that treaties that
fall within established lines of self-execution precedent, such as
bilateral treaties granting aliens property or business rights, will
continue to be treated as self-executing. It is uncertain, however,
to what extent treaties not covered by existing lines of precedent,
and which lack Senate declarations, will be viewed as judicially en-
forceable. One example is the Vienna Convention on Consular Re-
lations, which gives arrested foreign nationals the right to have their
consulate notified of their arrest and to communicate with their
consulate.35 As will be discussed, this treaty provision forms part of
the backdrop of the Medellin case, although the Supreme Court
reserved judgment on whether it was self-executing. The Geneva
Conventions governing the treatment of classes of individuals dur-
ing wartime are another example, as detainees in the war on ter-
rorism have sought to invoke them to challenge their detention,
treatment, and trial.36 Whether these and other treaties will be
found to be self-executing will be affected by whatever presumption
(if any) that courts apply with respect to self-execution and by the
types of materials that courts consider in making the determination.
II. SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND
In this part, I stake out my first claim: the Supremacy Clause
does not by itself tell us the extent to which treaties should be
judicially enforceable. The Supremacy Clause states that "all Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Critics of non-self-
" See, for example, Vdzquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 685-94 (cited in note 7) (doubting
the constitutional validity of self-execution declarations).
3 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Art 36.
36 See, for example, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 415 F3d 33, 38-40 (DC Cir 2005) (concluding
that the Third Geneva Convention was not judicially enforceable), reversed on other
grounds, 548 US 557 (2006).
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execution emphasize the word "all" and suggest that non-self-ex-
ecution is problematic because it means that not all treaties are
judicially enforceable. In making this argument, critics incorrectly
equate supreme law of the land with automatic judicial enforce-
ability.
A brief consideration of the other forms of supreme federal law-
federal statutes and the Constitution-shows that judicial enfor-
ceability is not a prerequisite for status as supreme law of the land.
Suits by citizens who are not concretely injured by government
lawbreaking cannot bring suit, even if it means that no one can ever
bring the suit.37 Certain constitutional questions are considered
nonjusticiable political questions.38 Congress can sometimes deprive
the courts of jurisdiction to hear federal statutory claims, such as
statutory claims relating to discretionary agency action.39 States have
broad immunity from suit on federal law claims, even though they
are obligated to comply with federal law.' Conditional spending
provisions and statutory delegations of discretionary authority to
the Executive are also often not judicially enforceable.41 In all of
these and similar situations we do not think that there is any vio-
lation of, or even tension with, the Supremacy Clause.
Even when a statute is judicially enforceable, Congress often un-
controversially regulates the extent to which it is enforced, and how
it is enforced, further suggesting that the Supremacy Clause does
not deprive the national political branches of flexibility over this
issue. Thus, for example, even though the Supremacy Clause makes
statutes supreme over state law, Congress sometimes enacts statutes
that expressly do not preempt state law. 2 Moreover, it is not un-
37 See, for example, United States v Richardson, 418 US 166, 179 (1974) ("[T]he absence
of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument
that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to
the political process.").
3 See, for example, Nixon v United States, 506 US 224 (1993).
39 See, for example, Webster v Doe, 486 US 592 (1988).
See, for example, Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida,
517 US 44 (1996).
41 See, for example, Gonzaga University v Doe, 536 US 273 (2002) (disallowing private
enforcement of Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act); Dept of the Navy v Egan, 484
US 518, 526-30 (1988) (disallowing review of denial of security clearance).
42 See, for example, 15 USC § 7707(b)(2) (stating that statute relating to electronic mail
"shall not be construed to preempt" certain state laws); 18 USC § 896 (stating that statute
relating to extortionate credit transactions "does not preempt any field of law with respect
to which State legislation would be permissible in the absence of this [statute]").
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common for Congress to limit standing to sue or to expressly or
implicitly preclude private rights of action.43 It is also widely ac-
cepted that Congress can limit the domestic enforceability of con-
gressional-executive agreements, which constitute the vast majority
of the international agreements concluded by the United States in
the modern era (and which constitute binding "treaties" under in-
ternational law).'
Statutes delegating implementation authority to the Executive
provide a particularly close analogy to non-self-executing treaties.
Consider, for example, the statute at issue in the famous foreign
affairs case, United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.45 The statute
there authorized President Franklin Roosevelt to criminalize the
sale of arms to two countries involved in a conflict in Latin America
if he found that such criminalization "may contribute to the rees-
tablishment of peace between those countries." Before Roosevelt
implemented this statute, it would not have been judicially enforce-
able, and yet it still would have been part of the "Laws of the United
States" referenced in the Supremacy Clause. In a treaty, the Senate
and President might similarly delegate domestic implementation
discretion to nonjudicial actors-that is, to either Congress or the
Executive Branch. Many statutory provisions are like this, and no
one thinks that the Supremacy Clause requires that these provisions
create self-executing rules of decision for the judiciary.
Ironically, supporters of broad treaty enforcement should be the
last ones to tie law status to judicial enforcement. Judicial review
is often unavailable on the international plane to enforce treaty and
other legal obligations. That fact, along with the frequent absence
of other formal enforcement machinery, has sometimes led people
to question whether international law is really "law." The prevailing
" See, for example, 6 USC § 134 (stating, in information infrastructure statute, that
"[n]othing in this part may be construed to create a private right of action for enforcement
of any provision of this chapter"); 12 USC § 1831 g(d) (stating, in banking statute, that
"[tihis section may not be construed as creating any private right of action"). See also
Paul B. Stephan, Private Remedies for Treaty Violations After Sanchez-Llamas, II Lewis &
Clark L Rev 65 (2007).
"For example, Congress restricted the domestic judicial enforceability of the GATT
and NAFTA trade agreements. See 19 USC § 3512; 19 USC § 3312. For acceptance of
this congressional authority, see, for example, Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States
Constitution at 217 (cited in note 8); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States
Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Chi Kent L Rev
515, 525-26 (1991); Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate
Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 Chi Kent L Rev 571, 641 (1991).
's 299 US 304 (1936).
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view among international law scholars, however, is that international
law can meaningfully be described as law despite the frequent ab-
sence of formal enforcement mechanisms, including the absence of
judicial review.'6 Supporters of a broad approach to treaty self-
execution are particularly likely to hold this view about international
law. Yet if international law can be law on the international plane
without judicial enforceability, why is that not also true on the
domestic plane?
Of course, there is a relationship between a law's status as supreme
law of the land and judicial enforceability, a relationship highlighted
by the statement in the Supremacy Clause that state judges shall
be bound by the supreme law of the land, "anything in the Con-
stitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." The
supreme law of the land takes precedence over conflicting state law,
and one method of enforcing that supremacy is through the courts.
But this relationship is not a necessary one. If in concluding the
treaty the Senate and President have validly precluded judicial en-
forcement (an issue addressed in the next part), then the state judges
clause does not come into play. The inclusion of treaties in the
Supremacy Clause simply, but very importantly, allows the U.S.
treaty-makers to preempt state law if they want to, without the pos-
sibility that state legislatures or judges will nullify the preemption.
The argument for more mandatory judicial review of treaty ob-
ligations depends on a separation-of-powers-oriented, rather than
federalism-oriented, construction of the Clause. Critics of non-self-
execution argue that treaties were included in the Supremacy Clause
to help avert U.S. treaty violations, something that they contend
will be more likely to occur without self-execution.47 As an initial
matter, it is important to remember that U.S. compliance with its
treaty obligations generally does not depend on self-execution.
There are many ways for a nation to comply with a treaty without
46 See, for example, Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990);
Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (2d ed 1979); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Ohey International Law? 106 Yale L J 2599 (1997).
" See, for example, Sloss, 36 UC Davis L Rev at 16 (cited in note 25) ("The Framers
included treaties in the Supremacy Clause to help promote U.S. compliance with its treaty
obligations."); Vizquez, 89 Am J Ind L at 706 (cited in note 6) (contending that treaties
were included in the Supremacy Clause "to avert conflicts with other nations that could
be expected to result from violations of treaties attributable to the United States"); Viz-
quez, 122 Harv L Rev at 675 (cited in note 7) ("It was to avoid such friction that the
Constitution gave treaties the force of domestic law and instructed judges to give them
effect.").
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direct judicial application, including preexisting legislation, new leg-
islation, and executive action, and U.S. compliance with most trea-
ties is not in fact accomplished through its courts. As discussed
below in Part III, treaties are never self-executing in some countries,
and yet those countries generally manage to comply. Critics of
political branch flexibility with respect to the issue of self-execution
also neglect to consider the ex ante effects of eliminating such flex-
ibility. Among other things, if the political branches could not reg-
ulate the domestic effects of treaties, they would likely enter into
fewer, and less significant, treaty commitments.4"
In any event, the "compliance" description of the Supremacy
Clause is potentially misleading because it neglects to mention the
breaching parties that the Founders were worried about-the states.
Almost everyone agrees that the inclusion of treaties in the Su-
premacy Clause was a response to a specific problem under the
Articles of Confederation, which is that the Articles did not give
the national government sufficient authority to ensure state com-
pliance with treaty obligations. This was particularly an issue with
respect to the 1783 peace treaty with Great Britain, which had a
provision requiring that British creditors be allowed to collect on
pre-Revolutionary War debts. Because some states had enacted laws
preventing compliance with that provision, the British refused to
comply with a provision in the treaty obligating them to vacate
military forts in the northwest. The Continental Congress took the
position that the treaty was "part of the law of the land" binding
on the states,49 but this was not expressly stated in the Articles of
Confederation. Perhaps because of this, the Continental Congress
simply proceeded to request that the states repeal any laws incon-
sistent with the peace treaty, which generated compliance from
some but not all of the states.
During the Constitutional Convention, the "Virginia Plan"
would have addressed the problem of state noncompliance with
federal law by giving the national legislature the power to "negative"
state laws, an idea particularly championed by James Madison. The
proposed negative approach was ultimately rejected at the Con-
" See, for example, Bradley and Goldsmith, 149 U Pa L Rev at 410-16 (cited in note
22) (documenting how non-self-execution declarations and other conditions helped break
the logjam that had prevented U.S. ratification of human rights treaties).
" See 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 124 (March 21, 1787); see also 32 Journals
of the Continental Congress 177 (April 13, 1787).
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vention, in part because it was thought to intrude too much on
state sovereignty. Instead, the Convention adopted the Supremacy
Clause, a version of which was originally set forth in the "New
Jersey Plan." As originally proposed, the Supremacy Clause stated
that treaties and other federal laws would be "supreme law of the
respective States."' As submitted to the Committee of Style near
the end of the Convention, the Clause still referred to the "supreme
law of the several States."' The Committee changed the wording
of the Clause, without explanation, to the "supreme Law of the
Land."
Madison maintained throughout the Convention that the Su-
premacy Clause approach was inadequate to ensure against state
violations of federal law, including treaties." In defending the Con-
stitution in The Federalist Papers, however, he argued that including
treaties in the Supremacy Clause should be considered unobjec-
tionable given that the Continental Congress could already "make
treaties which they themselves have declared and most of the States
have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land." 4 As Madison's
implicit reference to the British peace treaty experience suggests,
the Federalist defense of the Supremacy Clause was framed in terms
of the relationship between the national government and the states.
For example, Hamilton complained in Federalist No. 22 that, under
the Articles of Confederation, treaties were "liable to the infractions
of thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of
final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those legislatures,"
with the result that "[t]he faith, the reputation, the peace of the
whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices,
the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is com-
posed."5 The state ratification debates, as Professor Julian Ku has
observed, similarly "focused on what we would recognize today as
the federalism question," and they "appear to confirm that the new
s°I The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 245 (Max Farrand ed, 1911).
II The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 572 (Max Farrand ed, 1911).
12 See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, The Supremacy Clause: A Reference Guide to
the United States Constitution (2004).
53 See, for example, I The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 316 (cited in 50)
(expressing concern that the New Jersey Plan would not sufficiently prevent individual
states from imposing on the whole country a "rupture with other powers").
'4 Federalist 38 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 238 (1961).
"Federalist 22 (Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers at 151 (cited in note 54).
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Constitution was intended to prevent the state violations of treaties
that had occurred during the Articles period.
's6
These materials suggest that the Founders did not want U.S.
compliance with treaties to be dependent on state law. The Foun-
ders understandably concluded that, unless it was clear that treaties
took precedence over state law, an individual state could enact laws
that would impose harmful externalities on the entire nation, and
the national government would be powerless to prevent it. As Justice
Chase would later explain in a decision applying the British peace
treaty to preempt a Virginia statute, "[a] treaty cannot be the su-
preme law of the land, that is of all the United States, if any act of
a state legislature can stand in its way.""7 The Founders might have
assumed as well that the usual mechanism for ensuring state com-
pliance with treaties would be judicial review, although Professor
Yoo has contested this proposition.
Nothing in this history, however, suggests that treaties were in-
cluded in the Supremacy Clause in order to empower the courts
to deter or redress national government breaches of treaties, or in
any other way limit the national political branches' control over
treaty compliance. Indeed, the entire thrust of the adoption of the
Supremacy Clause was one of empowering the national government
to operate more effectively. As Professor Christopher Drahozal
notes in his book on the Supremacy Clause:
Certainly the Supremacy Clause does away with the question
under the Articles of Confederation of whether states have to
implement treaties before they take effect. That possibility, the
subject of debate and federal action in connection with the Treaty
of Peace with Great Britain, is conclusively rejected by the Su-
premacy Clause. Beyond that, however, the resolution of the self-
execution debate is less clear, at least with respect to the pre-
emption of state law. 8
"6Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal
Statutes, 80 Ind LJ 319, 377 (2005).
" Ware v Hylton, 3 US (3 Dall) 199, 236 (1796) (Chase, J); see also, for example, Alona
E. Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America, 30 Brit Year Book Intl L
178, 180-81 (1953) ("Experience under the Articles of Confederation lent support to the
decision of the Constitutional Convention that, in a federal system, the conclusion of
treaties must necessarily be within the exclusive competence of the Central government
and that treaties must take precedence over the constitutions and laws of the several
States.").
" Drahozal, The Supremacy Clause: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution at
160 (cited in note 52).JohnJay, a particularly strong supporter of international lawamong
the Founders, denied in Federalist 64 that treaties should be "repealable at pleasure" by
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To put it differently, there is no reason to think that the Supremacy
Clause removes the international political dimension of treaties,
which leaves to national governments the ultimate responsibility
for deciding whether and how to comply with treaty obligations,
and for accepting whatever international consequences may flow
from that decision. The Supremacy Clause simply ensures that in
the United States this responsibility rests at the federal rather than
state level.
The federalism orientation of the Supremacy Clause is further
reflected in the fact that it refers only to state judges and state laws
and does not mention the federal political branches. The Consti-
tution addresses the Executive Branch's obligation to comply with
federal law not in the Supremacy Clause but rather in the Take
Care Clause of Article II." As for Congress, it is well settled that
Congress has the authority to override both treaties and statutes,
despite their status as supreme law of the land.6" Congress does of
course have an obligation to comply with the Constitution, but the
Supreme Court in Marbury described this obligation as emanating
principally from the nature of a written constitution that assigns
limited and enumerated powers to the national government rather
than from the Supremacy Clause.6" The pattern of judicial enforce-
ment of treaties throughout U.S. history also comports with a fed-
eralism rather than separation-of-powers understanding of the Su-
premacy Clause. As Professor Wu has found, most judicial
enforcement of treaties has been directed at states and localities,
and, even outside that context, courts have tended to "look for
the United States, but he was probably speaking there about the international plane rather
than domestic plane, and in fact he remarked that "[t]he proposed Constitution ...has
not in the least extended the obligation of treaties." Federalist 64 (Jay) in The Federalist
Papers at 394 (cited in note 54); see also Ku, 80 Ind L J at 378 (cited in note 56) ("Jay's
claim that treaties could never be cancelled without agreement by the other treaty party
reveals that he was probably analyzing treaties in their international character without
taking into account the complications of how to carry out treaties under municipal law.").
59 See US Const, Art II, § 3 (stating that the President "shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed").
o Congress obviously has the ability to override earlier congressional enactments. As
for overriding earlier treaties, see, for example, Whitney v Robertson, 124 US 190, 195
(1888) (reasoning that Congress can override a treaty and explaining that "[t]he duty of
the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will").
6 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803). The Court did note at the
end of its opinion, however, that it was not "entirely unworthy of observation" that the
Constitution is listed before the "Laws of the United States" in the Supremacy Clause
and that the phrase "Laws of the United States" in that Clause is qualified by the re-
quirement that they be "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution. See id at 180.
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signals from Congress or the Executive that might show who is
meant to be responsible for enforcing a given treaty.
'6 2
Once the concept of supreme law of the land is viewed as po-
tentially separate from automatic judicial enforceability, it is easier
to understand contemporary judicial and political branch practice
relating to treaties. Consider, for example, the non-self-execution
declarations that the Senate and President sometimes include with
their consent to treaties. These declarations are not an effort to
turn off the Supremacy Clause, as some critics contend. They are
simply an effort by the U.S. treaty-makers to regulate the separable
issue of judicial enforceability. I will say more about these decla-
rations in the next part, and I will address in that discussion other
constitutional objections that might be raised against them. For
now, it is important to note that, in order to conclude that they
violate the Supremacy Clause, one would need to read that Clause
as not only mandating direct judicial enforceability, but doing so
even when the Senate and President expressly do not desire judicial
enforceability, and even when they have concluded that other U.S.
laws already place the United States in compliance with the treaty.
Again, there is nothing in the history of the Supremacy Clause that
suggests such a mandate.
More generally, if there is no inherent conflict between non-self-
execution and the Supremacy Clause, it is more difficult to justify
a general presumption in favor of self-execution, at least one pre-
mised on the purported policies of that Clause. Critics of non-self-
execution typically describe the non-self-execution doctrine an-
nounced in Foster v Neilson as a problematic deviation from the
Supremacy Clause. Although most critics are willing to accept that
Foster has precedential force, they argue that its scope should be
kept to a minimum given what the critics describe as its constitu-
tionally dubious origins. Professor Vizquez contends, for example,
that although "it is too late to reject Foster-type non-self-execution
entirely[,]. . .Foster is reconcilable with the constitutional text only
if accompanied by a strong presumption of self-execution."63 But if
non-self-execution is not in fact at odds with the Supremacy Clause,
then at least this argument for a presumption in favor of self-ex-
ecution loses force.
62 Wu, 93 Va L Rev at 595 (cited in note 26).
63 Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 610, 643 (cited in note 7).
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III. RELEVANT INTENT
My second claim is that, in discerning whether a treaty is
self-executing, the relevant intent is that of the U.S. treaty-makers
(i.e., the Senate and President), not the collective intent of the treaty
parties. As I will explain, my claim does not depend on any particular
view about the relevance of ratification history or other nontextual
materials in the self-execution analysis. Indeed, my claim is com-
patible even with a pure "public meaning" approach to interpre-
tation.'
As Professor Vizquez has noted, "Courts and commentators seem
to agree that a treaty's self-executing character is largely, if not
entirely, a matter of intent."6 There has been substantial uncer-
tainty, however, over whose intent counts-the collective intent of
the parties to the treaty, or just the intent of the U.S. Senate and
President. Before Medellin, some lower courts had suggested, with-
out analysis, that the collective intent of the parties is what matters,66
and this is also the view of some commentators.67 By contrast, the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law reasons that the
intent of the U.S. treaty-makers should be dispositive. As the Re-
statement explains:
In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the United
States to decide how it will carry out its international obligations.
64 If it were appropriate to apply a public meaning approach to the issue of self-execution
rather than an approach focused on intent, my claim would be that it should be the U.S.
public meaning, not the international public meaning, that should be controlling, and that
the materials relevant to the public meaning would include the declarations included by
the Senate in its resolution of advice and consent. I do not explore here the precise
implications of such an approach, since courts and scholars have to date framed the self-
execution issue as one of intent, and that is how the issue is described in Medellin.
"' Wzquez, 89 Am J Intl L at 704 (cited in note 6). See also, for example, Edwin D.
Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Erecuting? 20 Am J Intl L 444, 449 (1926).
66 See, for example, United States v Postal, 589 F2d 862, 876 (5th Cir 1979) ("The question
whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation for the courts when the
issue presents itself in litigation, . . . and, as in the case of all matters of interpretation,
the courts attempt to discern the intent of the parties to the agreement so as to carry out
their manifest purpose."); Diggs v Richardson, 555 F2d 848, 851 (DC Cir 1976) ("In de-
termining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signatory
parties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain,
recourse must be had to the circumstances surrounding its execution.").
67 See, for example, Riesenfeld and Abbott, 67 Chi Kent L Rev at 608-09 (cited in note
44); Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 638-41 (cited in note 7). The Supreme Court's 1833
decision in United States v Percheman, discussed in Part IV, also could be read to suggest
an intent-of-the-parties approach, since the Court there looked to a foreign language
version of the treaty in discerning self-execution. See text accompanying note 104.
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Accordingly, the intention of the United States determines
whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United States
or should await implementation by legislation or appropriate ex-
ecutive or administrative action.68
Although I do not always agree with the Restatement's claims,
on this issue the Restatement is persuasive. Nations have widely
varying approaches to the domestic status of treaties, with some
nations (such as Great Britain) always requiring legislative imple-
mentation before treaties can be enforced by domestic courts, other
nations allowing most or all treaties to be enforced directly by their
courts, and still other nations allowing only some treaties to be
enforced in this way.6 9 Furthermore, international law generally
does not concern itself with the particular institutions a nation uses
to implement international obligations; nations are simply required
to comply with their treaty obligations, and it does not matter
whether they do so through their courts or through some other
mechanism. As a leading international law casebook notes, "Inter-
national law requires a state to carry out its international obligations
but, in general, how a state accomplishes that result is not of concern
to international law or to the state system."7 For these reasons,
nations almost never negotiate about treaty self-execution, espe-
cially for multilateral treaties. Moreover, parties negotiating a treaty
are typically indifferent to the issue, so even tools used for contract
gap filling would not work here. If the search for self-execution
turned on the collective intent of the parties, it would almost always
be a meaningless exercise.
Although some advocates of the intent-of-the-parties approach
recognize that there will almost never be any collective intent with
respect to self-execution," they argue that allowing senatorial and
68 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 111, cmt.
h (cited in note 14); see also John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems:
A Policy Analysis, 86 Am J Intl L 310, 329 (1992) ("It seems safe to conclude that the U.S.
constitutional practice and status is that the treaty-making officials, as a unilateral matter,
will control the determination of 'self-executing' in the domestic legal system.").
69 See Thomas Buergenthal, Self-Erecuting and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National
and International Law, 235 Recueil des Cours 303, 315-19 (1992 IV); Duncan B. Hollis,
A Comparative Approacb to Treaty Law and Practice, in Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R. Blak-
eslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington, eds, National Treaty Law and Practice 1, 40-47 (2005).
70 Lori F Damrosch et al, International Law: Cases and Materials 160-61 (4th ed 2001).
"' See, for example, Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 607 (cited in note 7) ("[E]xcept in the
rarest of cases, courts searching for a common intent of the parties regarding the need
for implementing legislation do so in vain.").
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presidential intent to control on this issue would be unconstitutional
because it would give the Senate and President a lawmaking power
outside of the Article II Treaty Clause.72 While the Constitution
allows the Senate and President to make law in the form of treaties,
these commentators contend that this is true only when they do so
in conjunction with one or more other nations. Therefore, the
argument goes, if the regulation of self-execution is not done in
conjunction with other nations, it is an unconstitutional exercise of
lawmaking authority.
One problem with this constitutional argument is that it fails to
distinguish between the making of substantive treaty commitments,
which is governed by international law, and the self-execution issue,
which, at least under current practice, concerns an issue of domestic
law. The making of substantive treaty commitments requires the
consent of one or more other nations because this is what is required
by international law in order for there to be a binding treaty. Nations
naturally bargain over those substantive terms, and, just as with
domestic contracts, the relevant intent for those terms is the col-
lective intent of the parties. Moreover, there is an interest in having
relatively uniform interpretations of these terms among the parties,
in part for reciprocity reasons. Self-execution, by contrast, is not a
matter of international law-the United States would not violate
international law by either having, or not having, self-execution.
Nor is there any particular need or desire for uniformity in the
approaches to self-execution. While one could imagine nations bar-
gaining over whether to require direct judicial enforcement of a
treaty, it almost never happens.
Although the regulation of self-execution could be described as
a type of lawmaking power (and, as discussed below, the Supreme
Court did refer to it this way in Medellin), it is not a constitutionally
problematic lawmaking power when exercised by two-thirds of the
Senate and the President. It is not a freestanding power, but rather
is simply an adjunct to the treaty-making power set forth in Article
II, and it only comes up if the full process for making a treaty has
been satisfied. Moreover, it is not a power to create any new ob-
ligations for the United States, but rather is simply a power to
regulate how those obligations are implemented internally. It can
therefore reasonably be viewed as a lesser-included power of the
72 See, for example, id at 639; Riesenfeld and Abbott, 67 Chi Kent L Rev at 599 (cited
in note 44).
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Senate and President's authority not to ratify the treaty at all, which
would also prevent judicial enforcement of the treaty.73 The prin-
cipal argument against such a lesser-included power is that the Su-
premacy Clause forces the U.S. treaty-makers to accept judicial
enforceability whenever they ratify a treaty susceptible to judicial
enforcement. But, as discussed above in Part II, nothing in the text
or history of the Clause, or in judicial precedent, suggests that the
Clause operates in that way.
There is one lower court decision from the 1950s that offers
support for the Treaty Clause argument, but it is poorly reasoned,
was vacated as moot by the Supreme Court, and has had no influence
since it was decided. That decision, Power Authority of New York v
Federal Power Commission,74 involved a treaty between the United
States and Canada pursuant to which the two countries agreed to
share water on the Niagara River. A preexisting federal statute gave
the Federal Power Commission the authority to issue licenses con-
cerning the use of U.S. waters. In approving the treaty with Canada,
however, the Senate had attached to its advice and consent what it
referred to as a "reservation" stating that "no project for redevel-
opment of the United States' share of such [Niagara River] waters
shall be undertaken until it be specifically authorized by Act of
Congress." As a result of this reservation, the commission concluded
that it lacked authority to issue a license concerning the use of the
Niagara River water.
In a 2-1 decision, the D.C. Circuit reversed the commission. The
majority concluded that the Senate's reservation was constitution-
ally problematic, and the court therefore assumed that the Senate
did not intend it to be binding. The court reasoned that the Con-
stitution gives the Senate and President only the power to make a
"Treaty," and that a treaty must concern matters of mutual concern
to the other treaty parties. The court suggested, however, that the
Senate's reservation was not part of the treaty because it "makes
no change in the relationship between the United States and Canada
under the treaty and has nothing at all to do with the rights or
obligations of either party.""5 The court cited, with apparent ap-
'" See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 303,
reporters' note 4 (cited in note 14).
74 247 F2d 538 (DC Cir), vacated as moot sub nom, American Public Power Association
v Power Authority of New York, 355 US 64 (1957).
" Id at 541.
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proval, occasional statements by officials and courts suggesting that
the Article II treaty power might be limited to matters of inter-
national concern.
The majority's analysis is questionable. There may be genuine
reasons to be concerned about the scope of the treaty power, and
I have myself highlighted some of those reasons in prior writings.7 6
Among other things, the treaty power might be used to circumvent
federalism restraints that would otherwise apply to Congress. But
a decision by the Senate and President simply to defer an internal
policy question for resolution by the full Congress, as in Power
Authority, does not implicate these concerns. As the dissent ex-
plained in that case:
It may well be that, no matter how broad the power to make
treaties, it is not without limits; and that, like any other power,
it can be abused. This case, however, does not pose an abuse of
the treaty power. The reservation in question is an instance of
self-denial, not usurpation. It does not subvert our constitutional
system. It was motivated by a desire that the treaty power should
not be used in a manner which would exclude the Congress at
large and the President from playing their normal roles in making
domestic law."
Professor Henkin, in a trenchant article criticizing the decision,
similarly explained that "[t]here has been no malafides, no 'repeal'
of legislation, no 'colorable use of the treaty-making power' for an
extraneous, improper purpose. The President and Senate have
merely refused to throw new and valuable resources into an old
established system of development which Congress may not have
intended and may not now desire."78
In any event, the decision has had essentially no influence. Not
a single court has relied on this decision since it was issued more
than fifty years ago.79 Nor has the decision affected political branch
practice, which, since the decision, has developed to include the use
76 See Bradley, 97 Mich L Rev at 390 (cited in note 3); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty
Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 Mich L Rev 98 (2000). See also Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 Harv L Rev 1867 (2005).
77 247 F2d at 552 (Bastian dissenting).
7' Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56
Colum L Rev 1151, 1173 (1956).
79 One dissenting judge relied on it. See Igartua-de la Rosa v United States, 417 F3d 145,
191 (1st Cir 2005) (Howard dissenting).
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of non-self-execution declarations. These declarations have consis-
tently been upheld by the lower courts, and the Supreme Court
recently suggested that they are valid."0 Even in academic writings,
the Power Authority decision has not been invoked extensively. One
likely reason is that its suggestion that the treaty power might be
limited to matters of international rather than domestic concern is
a difficult distinction to apply in practice and could easily lead to
undesirable consequences. If applied stringently, this distinction
might render invalid the U.S. ratification of a variety of important
treaties, including many human rights treaties, since those treaties
do not involve reciprocal promises in the traditional sense. (The
U.S. government does not condition its promise to respect the
human rights of its citizens on other countries' respect for the
human rights of their citizens.) Probably in part for this reason, the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations rejects any effort to have
treaty validity turn on the domestic-versus-international distinc-
tion."'
The intent-of-the-U.S. approach is not only constitutionally
valid; it also best explains judicial and political branch practice.
Unlike an intent-of-the-parties approach, this approach has an easy
time explaining the consistent deference that courts have given to
non-self-execution declarations attached by the Senate and accepted
by the President. Under the intent-of-the-U.S. approach, these dec-
larations are clear evidence of senatorial and presidential intent
concerning self-execution, which is the relevant intent for this issue.
Commentators who argue for an intent-of-the-parties approach, by
contrast, either find these declarations unconstitutional or have a
difficult time explaining their validity.8 2 Moreover, the intent-of-
the-U.S. approach would find valid the recent self-execution decla-
80 See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692, 735 (2004) (noting that the United States
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "on the express under-
standing that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in
the federal courts") (emphasis added).
"' See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 302,
cmt. c and reporters' note 2 (cited in note 14).
82 See, for example, Riesenfeld and Abbott, 67 Chi Kent L Rev at 296 (cited in note
44) (arguing that "the Senate lacks the constitutional authority to declare the non-self-
executing character of a treaty with binding effect on U.S. courts"); Sloss, 36 UC Davis
L Rev at 41-43 (cited in note 25) (arguing that the declarations are invalid when used in
certain ways); Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 672-85 (cited in note 7) (struggling with the
issue and ultimately concluding that the declarations are valid based on a complicated
analysis of the international law validity of a hypothetical reservation of non-self-
execution).
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rations attached by the Senate, as long as the treaty was otherwise
susceptible to judicial application. An intent-of-the-parties ap-
proach, by contrast, would likely see these declarations as uncon-
stitutionally expanding the international obligations of the United
States. 3 It is also worth noting that, outside of the human rights
area, declarations concerning self-execution have not typically been
included in the instruments of ratification that are communicated
to the other treaty parties, and the Senate has not been recom-
mending their inclusion in these instruments after Medellin.4 Such
communication would presumably be a constitutional prerequisite,
however, under an intent-of-the-parties approach. " All of this pur-
ported unconstitutionality should at least give us pause before com-
mitting to the intent-of-the-parties approach. 6
The intent-of-the-U.S. approach also explains why it is perfectly
appropriate for courts to consider treaty text when discerning self-
execution, as they have done since Foster. Treaty text is relevant
under this approach because it is what the Senate and President
specifically approve when agreeing to the treaty, just as statutory
text is relevant in discerning congressional intent with respect to
whether and to what extent a statute is to be judicially enforceable.
This is true, under the intent-of-the-U.S. approach, regardless of
whether the treaty text would mean something different to other
treaty parties on this question of self-execution (or mean nothing
at all to them on this question). The textual question under the
intent-of-the-U.S. approach is, simply, did the Senate and President
intend in agreeing to this language that the treaty would be directly
enforceable in U.S. courts? As discussed below, this is precisely the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Medellin. Supporters of the
intent-of-the-parties approach, by contrast, have a difficult time
83 See Vdzquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 687-88 (cited in note 7). Professor Vizquez attempts
to use the purported unconstitutionality of such declarations as a reason for a presumption
in favor of self-execution. See id at 690-91. If the self-execution declarations are in fact
constitutional, that reason goes away.
4 See text accompanying note 32.
See, for example, Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 641 (cited in note 7) (arguing for such
a requirement).
86 Congress's ability to regulate self-execution may also be at stake. Compare Carlos
Manuel Vizquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A
Critical Guide, 101 Am J Intl L 73, 89-91 (2007) (arguing that a congressional restriction
on judicial enforcement of the Geneva Conventions would be unconstitutional), with
Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions,
101 Am J Intl L 322, 339-41 (2007) (challenging that claim).
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explaining why text is relevant. Professor Vizquez, for example,
criticizes judicial reliance on treaty text in discerning whether trea-
ties are self-executing:
Because nations negotiating treaties rarely, if ever, select the
wording of a treaty with the question of legislative implemen-
tation in mind, judges who draw conclusions about this question
from treaty text are very likely attributing to the words a meaning
that was not intended by the parties.87
As made clear by the italicized language, this argument only holds
if the relevant intent is that of the parties, which, as I have argued,
it is not.
Contrary to what some commentators appear to assume, an en-
dorsement of the intent-of-the-U.S. approach, by allowing for uni-
lateral declarations of self-execution or non-self-execution, does not
require acceptance of something akin to legislative history in the
statutory context. Unlike legislative history, declarations regarding
self-execution are subject to the same domestic process as the un-
derlying enactment: the declarations are voted on by the Senate as
part of its resolution of advice and consent and take effect only if
the President decides to proceed with ratification after being pre-
sented with them. These declarations are therefore in effect part
of the relevant text, not a mere piece of legislative history.88 The
extent to which a court should look at other materials in discerning
the intent of the U.S. treaty-makers, such as ratification history,
depends on one's theory of interpretation, and no particular con-
clusion on this is compelled by the intent-of-the-U.S. approach.
That said, even hard-line textualists who resist the use of legislative
history might accept the relevance of certain considerations beyond
the words of the treaty, to the extent that those considerations shed
light on how the text would likely be understood by the U.S. treaty-
makers (or the relevant domestic public) with respect to the issue
of self-execution. These considerations might include the extent to
" Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 635 (cited in note 7) (emphasis added); see also id at
640 ("[Tjhe treaty itself will almost never have any relevant content on the question of
direct enforceability."); id at 660 ("[]irtually all treaties have no relevant content on the
question of direct versus indirect judicial enforceability.").
88 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee sometimes expresses a view about self-
execution in the ratification materials rather than in a formal declaration included with
the Senate's resolution of advice and consent. I am referring here only to the formal
declarations.
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which Congress has already regulated the subject covered by the
treaty, the existence or nonexistence of a history of domestic judicial
enforcement of similar treaty terms, and perhaps even the structural
or functional consequences of self-execution or non-self-execution.
As a result, there are likely to be materials for courts to work with
beyond the words of the treaty regardless of whether they consider
statements made in the ratification history.
In sum, when the United States enters into a treaty, one of the
decisions it can make concerns whether and to what extent the treaty
is to be implemented directly by its courts. Although this decision
may have international consequences, it does not typically involve
an international bargain, and it is not determined by international
law. Instead, it concerns a political decision about how the nation
will address its treaty obligations, a decision that may be influenced
by a mix of structural, diplomatic, and policy considerations. The
proper institutions to make this decision are the political institutions
involved in committing the United States to the underlying treaty
obligations, and it is therefore their intent that it is relevant.
IV. STATUTES AND TREATIES
As discussed in Part II, there are a variety of situations in
which federal statutes are not judicially enforceable, even though
statutes are part of the supreme law of the land. Proponents of a
broad doctrine of treaty self-execution respond that, even if this is
so, treaties should be no less enforceable than federal statutes, some-
thing that Professor Vizquez calls "the requirement of equivalent
treatment. ''8 9 My third claim, which I defend in this part, is that
there are important differences between statutes and treaties that
are relevant to judicial enforceability, and these differences suggest
less of a judicial role for enforcing treaties than for statutes, es-
pecially in the modern (i.e., post-New Deal and World War H) era.
One difference between statutes and treaties concerns the way
that they are drafted. Because treaties are international bargains
that reflect the input of other nations, they are less likely than
statutes to be drafted with either extant U.S. law or the U.S. legal
system in mind. As a result, it is not uncommon for treaties to use
legal terms and concepts that are different from those typically used
in the United States, even when the policies of the treaties are
89 Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 602 (cited in note 7).
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otherwise in accord with U.S. law. In addition, while treaties are
increasingly drafted to achieve statute-like objectives, the need to
find common ground among countries with widely varied legal sys-
tems, cultures, and preferences often results in a lack of linguistic
precision. These drafting differences between statutes and treaties
are likely to be particularly evident for multilateral treaties that have
numerous parties.
Another difference between statutes and treaties is that treaties
are less likely to envision domestic courts, or even judicial review
more generally, as the vehicle of their enforcement. Whereas U.S.
statutes are enacted against the backdrop of a well-developed prac-
tice of judicial review that includes a centralized national court
system, treaties are negotiated against the backdrop of a decen-
tralized system with a wide variety of legal systems, and the drafters
often envision different enforcement mechanisms than statutes,
most commonly diplomacy, but sometimes (as in the case of the
United Nations Charter provision at issue in Medellin) coordinated
international sanctions. While it may seem strange in this country
to think of law as divorced from judicial review, as explained in Part
II, this is not at all strange on the international stage, and inter-
national lawyers have long insisted that international law is law
despite the absence of judicial enforceability.
Unlike statutes, treaties are also a hybrid of contract and law.
Treaties inherently involve contractual commitments to other
nations and thus implicate considerations of international politics
and diplomacy, considerations that are particularly the domain of
the Executive Branch. To be sure, proponents of presumptive self-
execution understandably bristle when courts (including the Court
in Medellin) quote from the Head Money Cases for the proposition
that "[a] treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations"
that "depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest
and the honor of the governments which are parties to it."9 Pro-
ponents correctly note that the Court further observed in that case
that "a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights
upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the
territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of mu-
nicipal law and which are capable of enforcement as between private
o Edye v Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 US 580, 598 (1884).
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parties in the courts of the country."'" Nevertheless, the language
from the Head Money Cases reflects an important truth, which is
that, unlike statutes, treaties operate not only within the domain of
law, but also within the domain of international politics. The hybrid
nature of treaties helps explain why they are probably subject to
termination by the President unilaterally,92 whereas this is of course
not true for statutes.9 3 It also explains why courts tend to give greater
deference to Executive interpretations of treaties than they give to
Executive interpretations of statutes (even taking into account the
Chevron deference doctrine in administrative law).94
Treaties and statutes also differ in the way that they engage with
the U.S. democratic process. Statutes are enacted after two houses
of Congress deliberate on and approve them, often with much wran-
gling over the text, and they are signed by the President or passed
with enough votes to override the President's veto. Treaties, by
contrast, are negotiated by the President and then approved by a
supermajority of the Senate, which as a matter of practice has little
if any involvement in negotiating the treaty's text and, subject to
an ability in some instances to decline consent to particular treaty
provisions, has no authority to amend the product of the negoti-
ation. By leaving out the House of Representatives entirely and
leaving even the Senate out of the negotiation and drafting process,
treaty-making involves less of the machinery of representative U.S.
democracy than do statutes. Indeed, this is a principal point cited
by supporters of the use of congressional-executive agreements,
which involve the full Congress.9 5 Even if there are advantages to
91 Id.
92 See Goldwater v Carter, 617 F2d 697 (DC Cir 1979), vacated, 444 US 886 (1979).
9' Professor Vizquez spends considerable effort seeking to rebut the proposition that
the contractual nature of treaties prevents them from being enforced through domestic
courts. See Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 623-27 (cited in note 7). That proposition is not
a serious one, however, and it is not my contention here. Nor does Professor Vizquez's
rebuttal of that proposition establish, as he ultimately asserts, that the contractual nature
of treaties is "irrelevant" to the self-execution issue. See id at 626 (referring to the pur-
ported "irrelevance" of the fact that treaties are contracts between nations).
4 See, for example, Sumitomo SbojiAmerica, Inc. vAvagliano, 457 US 176, 184-85 (1982)
("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government
agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.");
see also Medellin v Texas, 128 S Ct 1346, 1361 (2008). Unlike Chevron deference, courts
defer to Executive interpretations of treaties even when expressed for the first time in
litigation. See, for example, De Los Santos Mora v New York, 524 F3d 183, 204 (2d Cir
2008).
"s See, for example, Hathaway, 117 Yale L J 1236 (cited in note 2).
160 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
having a less transparent and populist process for concluding agree-
ments with other nations (as the constitutional Founders believed),
from a democratic theory perspective treaties are probably a less
attractive vehicle than statutes for making domestic law.96 This is
presumably part of the reason that it has long been assumed that,
unlike statutes, treaties may not by themselves create criminal li-
ability in the United States.97
Defenders of self-execution equivalency for statutes and treaties
often point to the "last-in-time doctrine," which holds that, when
there is a conflict between a federal statute and a self-executing
treaty, U.S. courts will apply the later in time of the two enact-
ments.9" This doctrine, however, makes no claim about the extent
to which treaties and statutes should be judicially enforceable, but
rather simply holds that when both are enforceable the later in time
is controlling. In any event, despite the doctrine, it appears that
courts have been quite reluctant to allow treaties to displace statutes.
There is only one Supreme Court decision that has clearly allowed
a treaty to supersede a statute, Cook v United States, and in that case
the Executive Branch pushed for this outcome and thus sought to
overturn the actions of its own Coast Guard.99 Moreover, as Pro-
fessor Tim Wu has noted, "because non-self-execution or other
doctrines of deference can be, and are, used to prevent a later-in-
time treaty from abrogating an earlier statute, the last-in-time rule
is not a full or accurate portrayal of judicial practice."' 0
The reluctance of U.S. courts to allow treaties to supersede fed-
eral statutes can be traced back to the decision that is said to be
96 In many instances it is likely to turn out that the concurrence of two-thirds of the
Senate will represent a majority of the country's population, but this will not necessarily
be the case. If large states are in dissent, two-thirds of the Senate can represent substantially
less than a majority of the population, given that small and large states have equal rep-
resentation in the Senate. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, 99 Colum L Rev at
2240 n 79 (cited in note 11). Senators also of course have much longer terms than members
of the House, which (by design) may make them less responsive to democratic majorities.
97 See, for example, Hopson v Krebs, 622 F2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir 1980); United States v
Postal, 589 F2d 862, 877 (5th Cir 1979); The Over the Top, 5 F2d 838, 845 (D Conn 1925).
"8 See, for example, Whitney v Robertson, 124 US 190, 194 (1888); Cook v United States,
282 US 102, 118-19 (1933). There is debate among commentators over whether the last-
in-time rule is consistent with Founding understandings, with some commentators claim-
ing that treaties should always trump statutes, other commentators claiming that statutes
should always trump treaties, and still other commentators defending the status quo.
" See 288 US 102 (1933); Wu, 93 Va L Rev at 597 (cited in note 26).
oWu, 93 Va L Rev at 595-96 (cited in note 26).
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the genesis of the self-execution doctrine, Foster v Neilson.' Foster
involved an 1819 treaty between the United States and Spain that
ceded certain disputed territory east of the Mississippi River to the
United States. The petitioners claimed title to a tract of land within
the territory based on an 1804 grant from Spain, and on that basis
sought to eject the respondent from the tract. The English-language
version of the treaty provided in relevant part that all grants of land
made by Spain in the ceded territory prior to the treaty "shall be
ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands to
the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories
had remained under the dominion" of Spain. The Court famously
concluded that this provision was in "the language of contract" and
therefore "addresse[d] itself to the political, not the judicial de-
partment; and the legislature must execute the contract before it
can become a rule for the Court."' 2
What many descriptions of this decision fail to note is that, before
concluding the treaty with Spain, the U.S. government had taken
the position that the area encompassing the tract at issue in the
case had already been ceded by Spain to France in 1800, and that
France had conveyed it to the United States in 1803 as part of the
Louisiana Purchase. This view, moreover, was reflected in several
federal statutes enacted prior to the treaty. It was against that back-
drop that the Supreme Court concluded that "the legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court" and
that, in the meantime, the Court was "not at liberty to disregard the
existing laws on the subject."'
'1 3
Critics of Foster often point out that the Court changed its view
about the enforceability of the treaty provision several years later
in United States v Percheman, after examining the Spanish version
of the treaty. 4 Critics contend that Percheman shows the weakness
of the Foster precedent and provides support for a presumption in
favor of self-execution."' Importantly, however, the land at issue in
Percheman was indisputably within Spanish territory at the time of
10' See 27 US at 314-15. The concept of non-self-executing treaties predated Foster.
Justice Iredell discussed the concept, for example, in his circuit court decision in the Ware
v Hylton case in the 1790s. See 3 US 199, 272 (1796) (Iredell).
15227 US at 314-15.
'0' Id at 314-15 (emphasis added).
'0' 32 US (7 Pet) 51 (1833).
0 See, for example, Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 607-08, 644-45 (cited in note 7).
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the 1819 treaty and thus, unlike in Foster, the grant in question did
not pose a potential conflict with preexisting statutes. 6 This pair
of decisions, therefore, can be seen as an early marker of judicial
reluctance to allow treaties to displace Congress's legislative role (a
reluctance also confirmed by Professor Wu's work).
The Power Authority decision, discussed in the last part, may be
another example of this reluctance. In reversing the Federal Power
Commission and declining to give effect to the purported reser-
vation, the Power Authority decision is said to undermine the legit-
imacy of non-self-execution declarations sometimes attached by the
Senate today to its advice and consent to treaties. As discussed above,
to the extent that it does indict such declarations, its reasoning is
unpersuasive, and it has had essentially no influence on subsequent
practice. The decision can reasonably be read more narrowly, how-
ever, in light of the statutory backdrop in that case, which by its
terms appeared to give the commission licensing authority over the
newly acquired water. In that light, the decision can be seen as
reflecting the reluctance of a court to allow a treaty provision (or
treaty reservation) to override a federal statutory scheme, which was
in fact the thrust of an important academic brief submitted on behalf
of the petitioner in that case.'0 7 Indeed, as Professor Henkin noted
in commenting on the Power Authority decision, "it seems doubtful
...that anyone would have challenged the power of the Senate
and President to append a provision that development of the waters
of the Niagara was to await congressional action, had there been
no applicable legislation.' '08
Assuming this reluctance to allow treaties to displace Congress's
legislative role is justified, it suggests a greater potential scope for
non-self-execution today than might have been true in the past. In
the modern era, both statutes and treaties have proliferated, and
the content and structure of treaty-making has changed such that
treaties are often the vehicle for broad-based legislative efforts.
106 See 32 US (7 Pet) at 88-89; see also Garcia v Lee, 37 US 511, 520 (1838) (noting
this distinction between Foster and Percheman and stating that "the case of Foster and
Elam v. Neilson must, in all other respects, be considered as affirmed by that of The
United States v. Percheman"); Buergenthal, 235 Recueil des Cours at 373 (cited in note
69) (also noting this distinction).
1"7 See Opinion of Philip C. Jessup & OliverJ. Lissitzyn for the Power Authority of the State
of New York (Dec 1955) (on file with author); see also Bradley and Goldsmith, 149 U Pa
L Rev at 453 (cited in note 22) (discussing this point).
"' Henkin, 56 Colum L Rev at 1172 (cited in note 78).
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These developments mean, among other things, that statutes and
treaties are much more likely to overlap with one another and to
express potentially different policy choices. Even when treaties re-
flect policies similar to those in existing U.S. statutes, treaties (as
noted above) tend to use different language than is used in the
statutes and thus, if enforced directly, may require significant liti-
gation to work out the implications of this language. (As discussed
in Part I, this is one reason the Senate routinely includes non-self-
execution declarations with its advice and consent to human rights
treaties.)"°9 One should expect, therefore, that in the modern era
courts would become less willing to apply treaties directly as rules
of decision, and this is precisely what appears to have happened.
As discussed earlier, the lower courts in the post-World War II
period have come close to presuming against self-execution, at least
for multilateral treaties and other treaties not covered by prior lines
of precedent."0
The rise of congressional-executive agreements also may reduce
the need for and desirability of direct judicial application of trea-
ties."' As the overlap between treaty-making and legislating has
increased, so has the number of congressional-executive agree-
ments, such that now they constitute the vast majority of inter-
109 See text accompanying note 23.
"0 See text accompanying note 15; see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, § 111, reporters' note 5 (cited in note 14) ("Treaties on subjects
that Congress has regulated extensively are more likely to be interpreted as non-self-
executing.").
"' Professor Vizquez attempts to invoke the phenomenon of congressional-executive
agreements as support for treaty self-execution, arguing that if an international agreement
is not likely to be self-executing, the President would have no reason to use the Article
II process instead of the congressional-executive agreement process, and thus the choice
of the Article II process must suggest a desire for self-execution. See Vizquez, 122 Harv
L Rev at 691-92 (cited in note 7). This argument is questionable on a number of levels.
As a legal matter, it is far from clear that congressional-executive agreements benefit from
the Missouri v Holland rule that allows Article II treaties (and legislation implementing
them) to regulate matters beyond the scope of Congress's authority. See, for example,
Hathaway, 117 Yale L J at 1339 (cited in note 2) (concluding that Missouri v Holland does
not apply to congressional-executive agreements). If not, that would constitute an inde-
pendent legal reason for the President to use the Article II treaty process in some instances,
regardless of whether the treaty will be self-executing. In addition, there might be all sorts
of nonlegal reasons why the President would continue to use the Article II process for
certain agreements that have nothing to do with self-execution, such as the avoidance of
likely political resistance from the Senate. This appears to be the case, for example, in
the arms control area, see Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law:
Cases and Materials 554-55, 558 (3d ed 2009) (documenting successful Senate insistence
on use of Article II process for arms control treaties), and yet it is unlikely that arms
control treaties are generally self-executing.
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national agreements concluded by the United States. As supporters
of this development emphasize, these agreements have the virtue
of including the full Congress in considering whether to approve
a treaty, and in deciding how the treaty should be accommodated
within the framework of existing U.S. law. The shift to these agree-
ments also reduces the issue of self-execution, since Congress often
specifies the level of judicial enforceability that it wants when ap-
proving the agreements (sometimes substantially limiting such en-
forceability).'12 Furthermore, it is easier to analogize these con-
gressional-executive agreements to statutes for purposes of judicial
enforceability because they actually are statutes.
V. MEDELLfN AND ITS AMBIGUITIES
The Supreme Court's decision last Term in Medellin v Texas,
despite some ambiguities, is generally consistent with the three
claims defended above." 3 Under the Vienna Convention on Con-
sular Relations, a treaty that the United States ratified in 1969,
when foreign nationals are arrested in the United States, the ar-
resting authorities are obligated to inform the foreign nationals that
they have the right to have their consulate notified of the arrest
and to communicate with the consulate." 4 Under a separate Op-
tional Protocol to the Vienna Convention that it also ratified in
1969, the United States further agreed to have disputes arising
under the Vienna Convention heard by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).
In a 2004 decision, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals, the ICJ concluded that the United States had violated
the consular notice rights of fifty-one Mexican nationals on death
row in various states, and that it was obligated to provide these
nationals with "review and reconsideration" of their convictions and
sentences in light of the violations, notwithstanding any procedural
defaults that might otherwise bar such review and reconsidera-
tion. " Under a provision in another treaty-Article 94 of the
United Nations Charter-a member of the United Nations (such
... See Hathaway, 117 Yale LJ at 1321 (cited in note 2); Wu, 93 Va L Rev at 648 (cited
in note 26).
"' My analysis in this part draws upon an earlier article. See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent,
Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 Am J Intl L 540 (2008).
114 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Art 36.
... 2004 ICJ Rep 12 (March 31), reprinted in 43 ILM 581 (2004).
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as the United States) "undertakes to comply with the decision of
the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a
party.
'116
After the ICJ's decision in Avena, the U.S. government took the
position that the ICJ had erred in concluding that the Vienna Con-
vention overrode domestic rules of procedural default, and the Su-
preme Court agreed with the government in a 2006 decision, San-
cbez-Llamas v Oregon, that did not involve any of the fifty-one
Mexican nationals covered by the Avena decision." 7 The govern-
ment also took the position that, although an ICJ decision to which
the United States is a party is binding on the United States as a
matter of international law, it does not "provide a free-standing
source of law on which a private party may rely in domestic judicial
proceedings.""' 8 Despite taking these positions, President Bush is-
sued a memorandum to his attorney general in February 2005 stat-
ing that the United States would comply with the Avena decision
by having its state courts give effect to the decision "in accordance
with general principles of comity" in the fifty-one cases covered by
the decision, and the government took the position that this mem-
orandum was binding on state courts. Shortly thereafter, the United
States withdrew from the Optional Protocol, which had been the
basis for the ICJ's jurisdiction in Avena.
Jose Ernesto Medellin, one of the fifty-one Mexican nationals
covered by the Avena decision, was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death in Texas in 1994. He first raised a Vienna Con-
vention claim in state postconviction proceedings, and the state
courts held that the claim was procedurally defaulted because it had
not been raised on direct review. Medellin subsequently sought
federal habeas corpus relief, which was denied. After President Bush
issued the memorandum concerning compliance with Avena, Me-
dellin once against initiated state postconviction proceedings. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief, concluding that
neither the Avena decision nor the President's memorandum op-
erated to displace Texas's law of procedural default.
.16 United Nations Charter, Art 94(1).
17 See Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331 (2006).
li8 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Ex parte Jose Ernesto Medellin, at 14
(Tex Ct Crim App Sept 2, 2005), at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/CCA
%20US%20Amicus.PDE
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In Medellin v Texas, the Supreme Court affirmed.' 9 The Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, first held that the U.S.
obligation to comply with the ICJ's decision in Avena was not self-
executing and thus did not override Texas's law of procedural de-
fault. The Court examined Article 94 and the other treaty provisions
to determine whether they "convey[ed] an intention" of self-exe-
cution, 2 ° and concluded that they did not. Endorsing the U.S.
government's argument on this point, the Court explained that the
phrase "undertakes to comply" in Article 94 does not constitute "a
directive to domestic courts" but rather constitutes a commitment
to take future political branch action.12' The Court noted that Ar-
ticle 94 "does not provide that the United States 'shall' or 'must'
comply with an ICJ decision, nor indicate that the Senate that
ratified the U.N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with im-
mediate legal effect in domestic courts."' 22 Rather, the Court un-
derstood the language of Article 94 as "confirm[ing] that further
action to give effect to an ICJ judgment was contemplated."'23 In
a concurrence, Justice Stevens similarly reasoned that the phrase
"undertakes to comply," especially when read in context, is best
construed as "contemplat[ing] future action by the political
branches."' 24
In addition to relying on the "undertakes to comply" language,
the Court noted that the remainder of Article 94 expressly set forth
an enforcement mechanism for noncompliance with ICJ decisions-
reference of the matter to the UN Security Council for possible
sanctions. The Court reasoned that "[t]he U.N. Charter's provision
of an express diplomatic-that is, nonjudicial-remedy is itself evi-
dence that ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in
domestic courts."'25 The Court also cited evidence suggesting that,
when it submitted the UN Charter to the Senate, the Executive
Branch envisioned that the Security Council would be the only
.. See 128 S Ct 1346 (2008).
121Id at 1356 (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v United States, 417 F3d 145, 150 (1st Cir
2005) (en banc)).
2' Id at 1358.
122 Id.
123 Id at 1359 n 5.
124 Id at 1373 (Stevens, J, concurring).
125 Id at 1359.
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avenue for enforcement of ICJ decisions.'26 More generally, the
Court accorded deference to the Executive Branch's views about
the treaties, noting that the Executive Branch had "unfailingly ad-
hered to its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically
enforceable federal law."' 27 The Court further emphasized particular
features of the ICJ adjudicatory system, including the fact that the
ICJ can only hear disputes involving nations, not individuals.'28
Finally, the Court observed that the consequences of giving direct
effect to ICJ judgments "give pause."' 29 The Court expressed par-
ticular concern that, under such a regime, even erroneous ICJ de-
cisions could override state law, and potentially even federal law. 3 °
The Court also worried that the ICJ would have the ability to bind
U.S. courts to extreme remedies, such as "annul[ling] criminal con-
victions and sentences, for any reason deemed sufficient by the
ICJ. '"'3 For these reasons, the Court suggested that it was unlikely
that the U.S. political branches had intended for the obligation to
comply with ICJ judgments to be self-executing.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected what it called the
"multifactor, judgment by judgment" approach to self-execution
suggested by Justice Breyer in dissent, whereby courts would con-
sider not only treaty text and drafting history, but also the treaty's
subject matter, whether the treaty provision confers specific indi-
vidual rights, and whether direct enforcement of the treaty would
require the courts to create a new cause of action.'32 The Court
reasoned that such an approach would be too indeterminate and
would give the courts too much discretion, thereby "assign[ing] to
the courts-not the political branches-the primary role in deciding
when and how international agreements will be enforced."'33 The
Court particularly objected that, under the dissent's proposed ap-
proach, a treaty provision could be self-executing in some cases and
non-self-executing in others. The Court thought it "hard to believe
that the United States would enter into treaties that are sometimes
'2 6 Id at 1359-60.
I2 71d at 1361.
128Id at 1360.
29 Id at 1364.
30 Id.
131 Id.
132 See id at 1362-63; id at 1382-83 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
31 Id at 1363.
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enforceable and sometimes not,"'34 and it expressed concern that
allowing courts to make such case-by-case judgments would give
the judiciary "the power not only to interpret but also to create the
law.
135
In addition to its finding of non-self-execution, the Court held
that the President's memorandum did not have the effect of over-
riding Texas's law of procedural default. The Court reasoned that
the conversion of a non-self-executing treaty obligation into self-
executing federal law is an act of lawmaking that falls to Congress,
not the President. 136 The Court further reasoned that, "[w]hen the
President asserts the power to 'enforce' a non-self-executing treaty
by unilaterally creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with the
implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate," and therefore his
action falls into the lowest category of presidential power under
Justice Jackson's framework from the Youngstown steel seizure
case.1
37
As discussed below, the Court's decision in Medellin is generally
consistent with the three claims defended above: that the inclusion
of treaties in the Supremacy Clause does not by itself tell us the
extent to which treaties are judicially enforceable; that the relevant
intent in discerning self-execution is that of the U.S. treaty-makers;
and that there are important differences between statutes and trea-
ties that are relevant to their judicial enforceability.
A. SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND
Consider first the relationship between Supremacy Clause and
judicial enforceability. The Court obviously saw no contradiction
between that Clause and the concept of non-self-execution. It cited
Foster with approval and did not treat it as some deviation from
the Constitution that had to be grudgingly accommodated because
of stare decisis.
Nor did the Court view the Supremacy Clause as mandating a
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See id at 1368-69.
'"Id at 1369; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J, concurring) ("When the President takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter.").
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presumption in favor of self-execution. The Court did not mention
any such presumption, and, in concluding that the treaties in ques-
tion were non-self-executing, it did not require clear evidence of
an intent to preclude domestic judicial enforcement. Instead, it
carefully examined the text, structure, and ratification history of
the treaties to discern whether they were self-executing. The
Court also emphasized that "Congress is up to the task of imple-
menting non-self-executing treaties," '138 further suggesting that it
did not have in mind a presumption in favor of self-execution.
Professor Vfizquez argues that Medellin is consistent with a gen-
eral presumption in favor of self-execution, but his claim depends
upon an unlikely reading of the Court's reasoning. Professor Viz-
quez suggests that the Supreme Court interpreted Article 94 of
the UN Charter as leaving parties to the Charter, including the
United States, "some discretion not to comply" with ICJ deci-
sions. 39 Instead of interpreting Article 94 as imposing a "hard"
obligation on the United States to comply with Avena, he contends
that the Court interpreted it as merely imposing a "soft" obligation
to try to comply, or to use its best efforts to comply." As a result,
Professor Vfzquez argues that the Court's non-self-execution
analysis should be limited to treaty provisions that, as a matter of
international law, convey nonjusticiable political discretion.
No party made this argument about Article 94, and, as far as I
know, there is no support for it in international law (and Professor
Vfizquez himself notes that such an interpretation of Article 94
would almost certainly be wrong).1 4 1 Instead, what the U.S. gov-
ernment had argued was that Article 94 constitutes "a commitment
on the part of U.N. Members to take future action through their
political branches to comply with an ICJ decision.1 42 The Court
quoted this language from the government's brief, and then im-
mediately stated, "We agree with this construction of Article
' 128 S Ct at 1366.
"9 Vdzquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 660 (cited in note 7).
'4 See id at 662.
'4' The ICJ has since confirmed that the Avena decision is unconditionally binding on the
United States as a matter of international law. The ICJ noted that both the U.S. government
and the U.S. Supreme Court accepted that proposition. See Judgment, Request for Interpretation
of the Jugment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v United States of America), 1 28, 36, 44 (Jan 19, 2009), at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/i 39/14939.pdf?P{PSESSID = d3b5b436b441b101 118fb70dbc03dfaf.
142 128 S Ct at 1358.
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94. ", 143 Neither the Court nor the parties suggested that Article
94 gave the United States some discretion not to comply with
Avena. Indeed, the Court observed that, "No one disputes that
the Avena decision-a decision that flows from the treaties through
which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect
to Vienna Convention disputes-constitutes an international law
obligation on the part of the United States."'" Instead of resisting
or qualifying that proposition, the Court distinguished interna-
tional obligations from the issue of self-execution, noting that "not
all international law obligations automatically constitute binding
federal law enforceable in United States courts."14'
In support of his contrary reading of the decision, Professor
Vdzquez cites an observation by the Court that giving ICJ deci-
sions immediate domestic effect would eliminate the "option of
noncompliance" contemplated by the UN Charter's placement of
enforcement authority with the Security Council. There is no
suggestion in this observation, however, that the Court meant that
the United States had the option under international law of not
complying with an ICJ decision to which it was a party. Rather,
the Court almost certainly meant that, given its veto power in the
Council, the United States would as a practical matter have the
ability to decide not to comply, and that the political branches
were aware of that "option" when ratifying the relevant treaties.
Indeed, the Court specifically noted that "the President and Senate
were undoubtedly aware in subscribing to the U.N. Charter and
Optional Protocol, [that] the United States retained the unqual-
ified right to exercise its veto of any Security Council resolu-
tion.""6 The Court further made clear that the "noncompliance"
it was referring to was "through exercise of the Security Council
veto-always regarded as an option by the Executive and ratifying
Senate during and after consideration of the [relevant treaties]." 47
By contrast, said the Court, direct enforcement of ICJ decisions
by U.S. courts would "undermin[e] the ability of the political




" Id at 1359.
"' Id at 1360.
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judgment."'48 In all these references, the Court is obviously re-
ferring to the political option of noncompliance, not one conferred
as a matter of law by the treaty.
Professor Vizquez contends that there is no way to explain the
Court's reliance on the phrase "undertakes to comply" in its self-
execution analysis other than through his reading of the deci-
sion.149 In fact, as noted above, the Court (and Justice Stevens in
his concurrence) understood that phrase as suggesting a future
obligation to comply through political branch action. The Court
distinguished the phrase from more present-tense terms such as
"shall" and "must," and also noted that the phrase did not "indicate
that the Senate that ratified the U.N. Charter intended to vest
ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts."'5 °
Regardless of whether this happens to be the best reading of the
phrase, the Court's approach is similar to that taken in Foster and
in a number of lower court decisions. 5' Indeed, Professor Vizquez
has himself noted in other writings that "[1]ater courts have in-
terpreted Foster as establishing that 'words of futurity' indicate
that a treaty provision is not self-executing."' 2 Professor Vizquez
argues that an intent-of-the-parties approach to self-execution
would not have shown that "undertakes to comply" was in fact
language of futurity, but, as I explain below, the Court was prob-
ably not following the intent-of-the-parties approach.
Despite all of this, Medellin need not be read as going to the
opposite end of the spectrum and requiring a presumption against
self-execution. Justice Breyer's dissent accused the majority of
adopting a clear statement requirement for self-execution, based
on the Court's comment in the presidential power portion of its
decision that, "[i]f the Executive determines that a treaty should
have domestic effect of its own force, that determination may be
implemented 'in mak[ing]' the treaty, by ensuring that it contains
148 Id.
V zquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 661-62 (cited in note 7).
50 128 S Ct at 1358.
" See, for example, Robertson v General Electric Co., 32 F2d 495, 500 (4th Cir 1929)
(citing "language of futurity" as evidence of non-self-execution); Sei Fujii v California, 242
P2d 617, 622 (Cal 1952) (finding UN Charter provisions to be non-self-executing because,
among other things, they were "framed as a promise of future action by the member
nations").
'52 Vizquez, 89 Am J Ind L at 703 n 40 (cited in note 6).
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language plainly providing for domestic enforceability."'' 3 But the
Court denied the charge, emphasizing that no "talismanic words"
are required for self-execution."i 4 The Court also made clear that
self-execution should be determined on a treaty-by-treaty basis,
stating, for example, that "under our established precedent, some
treaties are self-executing and some are not, depending on the
treaty." '155 In addition, the Court observed that prior decisions that
have found treaties to be self-executing "stand only for the un-
remarkable proposition that some international agreements are
self-executing and others are not," '156 and it reserved judgment on
whether the relevant provision of the Vienna Convention on Con-
sular Relations is self-executing, even though that provision does
not contain a clear statement of self-execution.'
If the Court was suggesting any presumption in Medellin, it was
probably just a presumption against giving direct effect to ICJ
judgments. It was after all the enforceability of ICJ judgments,
rather than the status of treaty obligations in general, that was the
precise question before the Court. The Court recognized this,
stating: "The question we confront here is whether the Avena
judgment has automatic domestic legal effect such that the judg-
ment of its own force applies in state and federal courts." ' The
Court subsequently noted that, "[g]iven that ICJ judgments may
interfere with state procedural rules, one would expect the rati-
fying parties to the relevant treaties to have clearly stated their
intent to give those judgments domestic effect, if they had so
intended." '59 A presumption against giving direct effect to ICJ
judgments can easily be defended, however, without resort to any
general presumption against treaty self-execution. ICJ judgments
concern disputes between nations that will often be politically
sensitive. As a result, there are good reasons to think that the
political branches would want flexibility in deciding how to im-
i See 128 S Ct at 1369; id at 1380 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
Id at 1366.
'sId at 1365.
' Id at 1364.
57 See id at 1357 n 4.
isR Id at 1356; see also id at 1357 n 4 ("The question is whether the Avena judgment
has binding effect in domestic courts under the Optional Protocol, ICJ Statute, and U.N.
Charter.").
"9 Id at 1363-64.
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plement these judgments after they are issued. Direct judicial en-
forcement of these judgments might even raise constitutional con-
cerns in some cases, relating, for example, to the Article III
authority of the federal courts, or to the role of the states in the
U.S. federal system.16°
The Court's decision in Medellin will probably mean, as the
dissenters asserted, that ICJ judgments issued pursuant to other
ICJ clauses in treaties will also be deemed to be non-self-executing
in the United States.16' This issue will rarely arise, however, in
view of the infrequency with which the ICJ issues judgments in-
volving the United States. Moreover, few other nations (if any)
give direct effect to ICJ judgments, so the United States will hardly
be alone in failing to do so. 6 ' Nor does Medellin entail a significant
change in U.S. practice: U.S. courts have never given direct effect
to an ICJ judgment, and, in fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held twenty years ago that such
judgments were not enforceable in U.S. courts at the behest of
private parties.'63
The one possible deviation in Medellin from my treatment of
the Supremacy Clause is the suggestion by the Court, in a variety
of statements, that non-self-executing treaties do not have any
status as domestic law.'64 My approach, by contrast, would distin-
guish between judicially enforceable treaty commitments and
those that are not, while treating all of them as the supreme law
of the land. Among other things, I believe my approach is easier
to reconcile with the text of the Supremacy Clause, which states
that "all" treaties ratified by the United States shall be the supreme
160 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order,
2006 Supreme Court Review 59; Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan L Rev 1557 (2003).
161 128 S Ct at 1388 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
162 See id at 1363 (observing that "neither Medellin nor his amici have identified a single
nation that treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts"); see also A. Mark Weis-
burd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MichJ Intl L 877, 886-87 (2000) (finding
little support in other countries for giving ICJ decisions binding force in domestic courts).
161 See Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v Reagan, 859 F2d 929, 937-38
(DC Cir 1988).
64 See, for example, 128 S Ct at 1356 ("This Court has long recognized the distinction
between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that-while they
constitute international law commitments-do not by themselves function as binding fed-
eral law.").
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law of the land (and here Professor Vfizquez and I are in agree-
ment).
1 65
There is in any event some ambiguity in the opinion about
whether the Court really meant to say that non-self-executing
treaties were not part of the supreme law of the land. The Court
never actually phrases it that way, and, in an opinion otherwise
highly focused on textual materials, it never seeks to explain how
its statements about non-self-executing treaties accord with the
text of the Supremacy Clause. 166 In addition, in a number of places
in the opinion the Court appears to equate the self-execution issue
with judicial enforceability.1 67 The Court's general test for self-
execution also focuses on whether the treaty is a "directive to
domestic courts, 1 6 ' not on whether the treaty is domestic law.
Moreover, a number of the Court's references to lack of domestic
law status were focused on the Avena judgment rather than on the
underlying treaties. 169 Even the Texas Solicitor General, who suc-
cessfully argued the case for Texas, has made clear that he views
non-self-executing treaties as part of the supreme law of the land,
despite the fact that his brief used phrasing similar to that used
by the Supreme Court. 7 °
The Court's position on this issue continued to be ambiguous
165 See also Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution at 203-04 (cited in
note 8) ("Whether [a treaty] is self-executing or not, it is supreme law of the land.").
166 For an effort to reconcile the proposition that non-self-executing treaties lack the
status of domestic law with the Supremacy Clause, see the postings by Nick Rosenkranz
in the Federalist Society Online Debate (cited in note 27).
167 See, for example, 128 S Ct at 1356 ("[Not all international law obligations auto-
matically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts.") (emphasis
added); id ("The question we confront here is whether the Avena judgment has automatic
domestic legal effect such that the judgment of its own force applies in state and federal courts.")
(second emphasis added); id at 1361 ("The pertinent international agreements, therefore,
do not provide for implementation of ICJ judgments through direct enforcement in domestic
courts...") (emphasis added).
161Id at 1358.
169 See, for example, id at 1357 ("[We conclude that the Avena judgment is not auto-
matically binding domestic law."); id at 1372 ("For the reasons we have stated, the Avena
judgment is not domestic law."). These statements are much easier to reconcile with the
text of the Supremacy Clause, since, unlike treaties, ICJ judgments are not listed in the
Supremacy Clause as part of the supreme law of the land.
17' See Ted Cruz, Remarks, Federalist Society Online Debate (cited in note 27) ("Of course,
all three treaties at issue (including Article 94 of the UN Charter) are 'federal law,' because
all treaties are 'federal law.' That wasn't the question before the Court. The question was
whether the treaties were 'self-executing,' by which the Court meant judicially enforceable
in U.S. courts."). Cf. Brief for Respondent, Medellin v Texas at 14 (No 06-984) ("[U]nless
the treaty reflects an agreement between the President and the Senate to create domestic
law, no such law is made.").
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in a subsequent order by the Court denying Medellfn a stay of
execution. In declining to issue the stay, the Court stated that "[i]t
is up to Congress whether to implement obligations undertaken
under a treaty which (like this one) does not itself have the force
and effect of domestic law sufficient to set aside the judgment or the
ensuing sentence."' 7 The italicized language would appear to be
superfluous if the Court believes that non-self-executing treaties
lack any domestic law status. For what it is worth, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has expressed the view after Medellin
that non-self-executing treaties are part of the supreme law of the
land. 172
While not particularly material to the analysis in this article,
the issue of whether non-self-executing treaties have some do-
mestic law status might matter in some contexts. It might matter,
for example, in debates within the Executive Branch over whether
the President is obligated to comply with a non-self-executing
treaty.'73 It might also affect the Executive Branch's ability to take
action voluntarily to enforce a non-self-executing treaty.174 In Me-
dellin, the Court reasoned that "the non-self-executing character
of a treaty constrains the President's ability to comply with treaty
commitments by unilaterally making the treaty binding on do-
mestic courts."17 At the same time, the Court disavowed any sug-
gestion that a non-self-executing treaty, without implementing
legislation, "preclude[d] the President from acting to comply with
an international treaty obligation," and indicated that "[t]he Pres-
ident may comply with the treaty's obligations by some other
7' Medellin v Texas, 129 S Ct 360, 361 (2008) (emphasis added).
72 See, for example, Exec Rept 110-12, 110th Cong, 2d Sess, Extradition Treaties with
the European Union (Sept 11, 2008) at 10 ("In accordance with the Constitution, all
treaties-whether self-executing or not-are the supreme law of the land, and the President
shall take care that they be faithfully executed."), at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 110_cong-reports&docid = f:er0 12.1 10.pdf.
1' Cf. Derek Jinks and David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions? 90
Cornell L Rev 97, 158 (2004) (arguing that "the President's duty under the Take Care
Clause includes a duty to execute treaties that are the law of the land"). The Take Care
Clause of the Constitution provides that the President is obligated to take care that the
"Laws" are faithfully executed. The government did not rely on that Clause as a source
of authority in Medellin, and the Court briefly dismissed the Clause's relevance at the end
of its opinion, on the ground that the Clause "allows the President to execute the laws,
not make them," and that "the Avena judgment is not domestic law." 128 S Ct at 1372.
The Court did not say there that non-self-executing treaties do not constitute "Laws" for
purposes of the Take Care Clause.
See generally Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 Colum L Rev 331 (2008).
'T' 128 S Ct at 1371.
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means, so long as they are consistent with the Constitution." '1 76
The distinction between lack of judicial enforceability and lack of
domestic law status also mattered to Justice Stevens's concurrence:
because Justice Stevens regarded the treaty obligation in question
to be part of the supreme law of the land, even though not self-
executing, he suggested (somewhat cryptically, to be sure) that the
states had an obligation to comply with it, even though they would
not be forced to do so by the federal courts.17 7
B. RELEVANT INTENT
The Medellin decision is also generally consistent with my sec-
ond claim, which is that the relevant intent for self-execution is
that of the U.S. treaty-makers. The Court stated that "[o]ur cases
simply require courts to decide whether a treaty's terms reflect a
determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that
confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect." '178 The Court also
noted that "we have held treaties to be self-executing when the
textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended
for the agreement to have domestic effect." '179 And, in summarizing
its finding of non-self-execution, the Court explained that
"[n]othing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting his-
tory, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the Pres-
ident or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judg-
ments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed
by 'many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.,,'
80
The Court's rejection of the dissent's proposed multifactor ap-
proach to self-execution was also premised on an intent-of-the-
U.S. approach. The Court stated: "The dissent's contrary ap-
proach would assign to the courts-not the political branches-the
primary role in deciding when and how international agreements
will be enforced.'
181
There are, to be fair, a few indications in the opinion going the
176 Id.
'.. See id at 1374 (Stevens, J, concurring).
"' 128 S Ct at 1366 (emphasis added).
171 Id at 1364 (emphasis added).
"' Id at 1367 (emphasis added) (quoting Sancbez-Llamas v Oregon, 126 S Ct 2669, 2687
(2006)).
181 Id at 1363 (emphasis added); see also id at 1360 (observing that "there is no reason
to believe that the President and Senate signed up" for giving direct effect to ICJ decisions).
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other way, which may suggest some confusion on the Court about
the issue. The Court began its self-execution analysis by referring
to Supreme Court decisions that have looked to the intent of the
parties in interpreting substantive treaty terms.' It also asserted
that its finding of non-self-execution was confirmed by the post-
ratification understandings of the treaty parties, something that
would not be particularly relevant under an intent-of-the-U.S.
approach." 3 The Court even considered in a footnote whether the
ICJ had views on the self-execution issue, while (properly) ex-
pressing some doubt about whether such views would be rele-
vant.1
84
On balance, though, the Court's decision is best interpreted as
endorsing an intent-of-the-U.S. approach. In addition to the many
direct statements to this effect quoted above, the Court relied on
the U.S. ratification history for the UN Charter rather than on
the collective negotiating history. More generally, the Court did
not attempt to ascertain how the relevant treaty language, such as
"undertakes to comply," would be understood by other treaty par-
ties. Furthermore, in the presidential power portion of its decision,
the Court expressed the view that if the Executive Branch could
make a non-self-executing treaty binding on domestic courts, it
would be acting "in conflict with the implicit understanding of
the ratifying Senate."' 85 That assertion may or may not be per-
suasive with respect to the treaties at issue in Medellin, but the key
point is that the Court focused here and elsewhere on the Senate's
and the President's intent.
Professor Vizquez claims that, despite the overwhelming num-
ber of references in the opinion to senatorial and presidential
intent, the Court could not have been considering that intent
because it paid close attention to the treaty text. Such text, Pro-
fessor Vfizquez asserts, "reflects the intent of the parties, not the
unilateral views of the U.S. treatymakers."' 186 Professor Vfizquez
fails to recognize that, as discussed in Part III, the text could be
relevant to both inquiries. Treaty text is of course relevant in as-
certaining the collective intent of the parties, but it is also relevant
I82 See id at 1357-58.
'8 See id at 1363.
s See id at 1361 n 9.
585 Id at 1369.
"'6 Vzquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 659 (cited in note 7).
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in ascertaining the unilateral intent of the U.S. treaty-makers,
which is the only intent there is likely to be with respect to the
issue of self-execution. Thus, as the Court explained, "we have
held treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions in-
dicate that the President and Senate intended for the agreement to
have domestic effect." '187 The Court also specifically defended its
emphasis on treaty text by noting: "That is after all what the Senate
looks to in deciding whether to approve the treaty." '188 Like Pro-
fessor Vizquez, Justice Breyer's dissent in Medellin misses this
point. Justice Breyer contends that looking at the treaty text for
evidence concerning self-execution is, at best, "hunting the snark,"
because it is unlikely that the parties will have reached an agree-
ment on the issue that would be incorporated into the text. 89 In
fact, only an intent-of-the parties approach to self-execution would
end up constituting a snark hunt.
To be sure, absent a specific declaration by the Senate, it is not
clear that text by itself will provide sufficient evidence of the U.S.
treaty-makers' intent concerning whether a particular treaty pro-
vision is self-executing. If the text does not, it may be unrealistic
to think that the Court can avoid the indeterminacy and judicial
discretion associated with the dissent's proposed approach. De-
spite its criticism of the dissent, however, the Court was probably
not insisting that text is the only relevant consideration in dis-
cerning such intent. Indeed, as noted above, the Court looked to
statements made in the ratification history to aid its understanding
of this intent."' The subject matter of the treaties in question-
international dispute resolution between nations-also appears to
have been relevant to the Court's assessment of likely intent. 9'
The Court even invoked functional considerations to support its
analysis.'92 In rejecting the multifactor approach proposed in dis-
sent by Justice Breyer, the Court appears principally to have been
objecting to the idea that a treaty provision could be self-executing
in some cases but not in others. A contextual approach could be
... 128 S Ct at 1364 (emphasis added).
Id at 1362 (emphasis added).
'8 Id at 1381 (Breyer, J, dissenting). See also Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 629, 636-37
(cited in note 7) (endorsing Justice Breyer's "snark" comment).
'90 See text accompanying note 126.
191 See text accompanying note 128.
192 See text accompanying note 129.
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applied, however, in a more categorical way, such that a treaty
provision would be either self-executing or not in all cases, avoid-
ing the Court's concern.'93
It is true, as Professor Vizquez points out,'94 that the presi-
dential power portion of the Court's decision reflects a formalistic
conception of lawmaking. The Court reasoned there that "the
terms of a non-self-executing treaty can become domestic law only
in the same way as any other law-through passage of legislation
by both Houses of Congress, combined with either the President's
signature or a congressional override of a Presidential veto."'
' 95
One might infer from that discussion, as Professor Vfizquez does,
that the Court would resist the idea that the U.S. treaty-makers
have an adjunct or lesser-included lawmaking power over self-
execution. But this inference is far from clear, since the exercise
of such a power still requires the use of the treaty process, that
is, two-thirds Senate consent and presidential approval. The
Court's concern in Medellin, by contrast, was with unilateral pres-
idential control over the issue, especially when that control con-
tradicted a decision made earlier by the U.S. treaty-makers. The
Court noted, for example, that "[w]hen the President asserts the
power to 'enforce' a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally cre-
ating domestic law, he acts in conflict with the implicit under-
standing of the ratifying Senate."' 196 Moreover, the Court's pres-
idential power analysis actually appears to assume that the U.S.
treaty-makers have exercised some domestic lawmaking power
when deciding that a treaty shall not be self-executing, since this
was the basis on which the Court concluded that President Bush
was operating within the lowest category of Justice Jackson's
Youngstown framework.197
'9'Cf. F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v Empagran S.A., 542 US 155,168-69 (2004) (rejecting
case-by-case approach to determining whether comity factors supported the application
of U.S. antitrust law to independent foreign injury in favor of categorical approach).
"' See Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 659 (cited in note 7).
195 128 S Ct at 1369.
1
96 Id.
'9' See id at 1369 ("[T]he non-self-executing character of the relevant treaties not only
refutes the notion that the ratifying parties vested the President with the authority to
unilaterally make treaty obligations binding on domestic courts, but also implicitly pro-
hibits him from doing so."). I am merely describing the Court's reasoning here, not
endorsing it. The fact that the U.S. treaty-makers did not intend for ICJ decisions to be
directly enforceable in U.S. courts would not necessarily mean that they wanted to preclude
the President from implementing such decisions if he or she chose to do so. More generally,
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C. STATUTES AND TREATIES
Consistent with my third claim, the Court also took account of
the distinct nature of treaties in its self-execution analysis. Quoting
the Head Money Cases, the Court noted at the outset that a treaty
is "'primarily a compact between independent nations' that or-
dinarily 'depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the
interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to
it.'"198 While the Court of course recognized that some treaties
are also domestically enforceable in U.S. courts, this is only true,
said the Court, "when the textual provisions indicate that the Pres-
ident and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic
effect."1
99
In finding that there was no such self-executing intent, the Court
took account of the treaty context. Among other things, the Court
observed that the requirement of compliance with ICJ decisions
was situated within an international legal system that emphasized
political rather than judicial enforcement-in particular, enforce-
ment through the Security Council, where the United States holds
a veto. The Court also expressed concern about transferring "sen-
sitive foreign policy decisions" to the state and federal courts, given
that "'[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government
is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legisla-
tive-'"the political"-Departments. ''2 °
In addition, the Court also observed in a footnote that even when
treaties are self-executing, "the background presumption is that
'[i]nterational agreements, even those directly benefiting private
persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private
cause of action in domestic courts."''" For this proposition, the Court
quoted from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, which
appears to be making an empirical claim about the nature of treaties.
Professor Vizquez dismisses the Restatement's observation on the
ground that "the Supremacy Clause generally makes treaties en-
forceable in our courts in the same circumstances as statutory and
the Court may have passed over too quickly the possibility that treaties, like some statutes,
could delegate enforcement authority to the Executive Branch.
1d at 1357.
Id at 1364.
200 Id at 1360 (quoting Oetjen v Central Leather Co., 246 US 297, 302 (1918)).
20! Id at 1357 n 3 (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, § 907, cmt. a (cited in note 14)).
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constitutional provisions of like content,"' ' 2 but, for reasons already
discussed, that is an overly broad reading of the Clause.
The Court's institutional process concerns associated with giving
direct effect to ICJ judgments were also related specifically to the
international context of the case. As noted above, the Court stated
that the consequences of the argument that ICJ decisions have direct
effect in the U.S. legal system "give pause," because the argument
would mean that an ICJ judgment "is not only binding domestic
law but is also unassailable" such that even erroneous ICJ rulings
would override state and possibly even federal law. While it is com-
mon for domestic courts to exercise this sort of authority, the Court
was obviously troubled by the idea that such authority had been
delegated to actors outside of the U.S. legal system. In this respect,
the decision was foreshadowed by the Court's earlier decision in
Sancbez-Llamas, in which the Court resisted the idea that U.S. fed-
eral courts should be bound by the ICJ's interpretation of a treaty.20 3
These concerns, which relate to democratic process and sovereignty,
are not typically implicated by domestic statutes.
Finally, the Court's discussion of the "option of noncompliance"
demonstrated its recognition of the dual law-and-politics nature of
treaty commitments. The Court was not advocating the breach of
U.S. treaty obligations, but it was recognizing that decisions about
whether and how to comply with such obligations are not purely
legal decisions but also involve questions of international politics.
As discussed above, the duality of treaties suggests that the role of
the courts in enforcing them may be somewhat more limited than
with respect to statutes, especially when such enforcement poses a
risk of undermining political branch management of foreign rela-
tions, a proposition evident at least since Foster. The long-standing
doctrine of deference to Executive Branch treaty constructions, in-
voked by the Court in Medellin, also takes account of this propo-
sition.
202 Vizquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 627 n 131 (cited in note 7).
203 See Sancbez-Llamas v Oregon, 126 S Ct 2669, 2684 (2006) ("If treaties are to be given
effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of
federal law 'is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,' headed by
the 'one supreme Court' established by the Constitution.") (quoting Marbury v Madison,
5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). The Court in Medellin made clear, however, that it
was "not suggest[ing] that treaties can never afford binding domestic effect to international
tribunal judgments." 128 S Ct at 1364-65.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Medellin is unlikely to re-
sult in a significant change in the extent of U.S. judicial enforcement
of treaties, but it may make it less likely that certain academic
ambitions about such enforcement will be achieved. As the Court
appears to have recognized, treaties have a dual nature in that they
are situated in the domain of international politics as well as in the
domain of law, and this duality is relevant to their judicial enfor-
ceability. Their dual nature means that their domestic judicial en-
forceability is in part a political decision, not some automatic rule
of the Supremacy Clause. The relevant intent in discerning whether
treaties are subject to such domestic judicial enforceability is in turn
the intent of the national political branches. Finally, the interna-
tional political dimension of treaties means that, as a class, they are
less likely than statutes to be subject to domestic judicial enforce-
ment, especially in the modern era.
Although judicial practice may not change substantially after Me-
dellin, we are likely to see increased use by the Senate of declarations
of self-execution and non-self-execution. Assuming such declara-
tions are valid, as this article has maintained, the Senate practice
should simplify the issue of self-execution over time. The wide-
spread and continuing use of congressional-executive agreements
may have a similar effect. In other situations it may be appropriate
to give deference to the current views of the Executive Branch about
the treaty's domestic enforceability. There will of course continue
to be circumstances in which there will be no clear guidance from
the political branches, and in those cases courts are likely to make
contextual judgments that take account of the text, structure, and
subject matter of the treaty, lines of precedent and other historical
practice, the congressional backdrop, and the functional conse-
quences of direct judicial enforceability. The doctrine of treaty self-
execution thus entails a degree of judicial discretion, but it is a type
of discretion that is ultimately subject to political branch control.
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